

On Political Intolerance and Cuba's Future: a Spanish Caribbean approach¹

Jorge Luis Romeu, Ph.D.

Research Professor, Syracuse University, NY/USA.
Director, Proyecto Juárez Lincoln Martí de Educación Internacional
<http://web.cortland.edu/romeu>

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Pobre Cuba, tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de los EEUU.

Adaptation of a phrase by General Porfirio Diaz.

INTRODUCTION

The Question *Where is Cuba Going?* has been frequently asked, since Raul Castro took over Cuba's government from his brother Fidel, in 2006, and started implementing reforms. Even at academic events, such as the 2012 ASCE² Conference, the issue was raised. However, such question may elicit several dubious answers. For, the current environment of *political intolerance*³ that has traditionally plagued Cuban history prevents parties in discordance from conducting fruitful negotiations, and arriving to efficient solutions. And we don't see any improvements until such situation changes.

The *relationship between intolerance and lack of negotiations, with system failure* is evident, as are also the advantages of tolerance and sound negotiating, with institutional progress. Such occurs under any political system; compare, for example, the impasse occurred in the American Congress, in 1994 and 2013⁴, with the fruitful legislation of the Johnson administration⁵, in the 1960s. Such problems are particularly destructive in totalitarian systems, where one of the two sectors monopolizes the power.

This paper overviews the last 250 years of Cuban history, with the objective of analyzing and identifying certain recurrent events, and extracting from them the key elements that characterize Cuba's proverbial intolerance. We illustrate the problems of intolerance under (1) the Spanish colony (1790-1899); (2) the Republic (1900 to 1959); and (3) the revolution (1959, to present). We identify common causes and features of intolerance, during these different periods. And we define a Cuban political behavioral model.

¹A shorter, working version of this paper was presented to the 2012 ASCE Conference, Miami FL.

² Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy: <http://www.ascecuba.org/> (Accessed X/30/13)

³ Within the context of this paper, *Tolerance* implies that one is willing and/or able to listen and understand the views of others, especially when they differ from our own. And that one is willing and able to *negotiate* them with others, especially with those who hold opposite views. *Intolerance* is the opposite.

⁴ When the intolerance of a faction, within a political party, forced the US government shot-down.

⁵ Which created the 1960s American Civil Rights legislation, as well as Medicare.

We then provide three examples of Ibero-American countries, where a negotiations process helped resolve serious national crises, and fostered peaceful evolutions from dictatorship to pluralism. The examples correspond to three very different countries, in three different time-frames and under three different political situations. They are, Spain in 1975; Brazil in 1985, and Mexico, in 2000. However different, they all overcome the previous intolerance, opening up their respective societies, thus achieving economic, political and social growth, way above their respective previous levels.

Finally, we propose to use such examples as a framework for the transitioning out of Cuba's half-a-century old dictatorship. Both Cuba's government and opposition can take ideas from these examples, adapting them to the Cuban situation and conditions.

OVERVIEW OF THE SPANISH COLONY IN THE XVIII AND XIX CENTURY

We begin in the 1760s. Before that, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and Venezuela (which until the XVIII Century, was under the *Capitanía General* of Santo Domingo), were poor and ill-attended colonies, because they did not have precious metals⁶. Hence, Spain invested small in them, and left them mostly to their own resources.

The city of Havana was an exception. For its excellent harbor and strategic position, it became the meeting place for the Spanish Fleet⁷. Havana became much richer and important than any other city in the Spanish Caribbean⁸ -or in Cuba. For, *the interior*,⁹ especially the traditionally neglected Eastern provinces of the island, had prospered mainly on illicit trade¹⁰. These large socioeconomic differences define the *love-hate relationship and rivalry* between Havana and *el interior*, which continue to our days.

In 1759, King Charles III, who had already ruled Naples for over twenty years, inherited the Spanish crown. With his long experience in government and very capable ministers¹¹, Charles III inaugurated a period of badly needed reforms, in Spain and its colonies.

In 1762, during the French and Indian War¹², the British attacked Havana, and held it for two years. This event changed the fate of the colony. The strategic position of Havana was so valuable to Spain that, after the war, it traded it to the British for Florida¹³. For the

⁶ Gold, silver, copper, among others. Mexico, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia had such precious metals.

⁷ *La Flota* carried silver and gold from Peru and Mexico, silk and species from Philippines. Guerra (1925).

⁸ A cultural rather than geographical classification, which includes Spanish possessions in, and around, the Caribbean Sea. Especially Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, have always maintained a close historical and human relationship. See Martínez-Fernández (1994), Arciniegas (1966), and Romeu (2005).

⁹ Usually, anything further than a few miles away from Havana is called *el interior*, or *el campo*.

¹⁰ Freebooters and buccaneers traded beef, hides and other agricultural products for flour, species, clothes, hardware. Bayamo, a smuggling center, became rich on such trade. Smuggling was also common in Santo Domingo, to the point that its governor was ordered by the King to burn all towns on the west of the island (today's Haiti), and to bring to the eastern part all Spanish colonists living there, thus facilitating its French colonization. See Franco-Pichardo (2002), Dorsainvil (1975), Evans-Smith (1985), Maso (1998).

¹¹ Campomanes, Floridablanca and Aranda, among the most capable. See Comellas (1985).

¹² Known as "Guerra de los Siete Años" in Europe, Spain and Latin America. Comellas, Ibid.

¹³ Spain regained Florida from the British after aiding Americans in their Independence. Maso Ibid.

remaining years of the XVIII Century, Spain sent to Cuba a series of capable governors¹⁴ who improved its social and material conditions, especially in and around Havana.

In 1789, the French Revolution changed Europe, as well as its colonies¹⁵. New ideas of liberty and equality encouraged the Haitian slave revolt and subsequent independence¹⁶. The consequences of Haiti's revolution for all Spanish Caribbean¹⁷, especially for Cuba, were significant. The impact on its economy and its population were extensive: hundreds of French planters moved to Cuba, re-established their efficient sugar and coffee plantations, and contributed a flow of new ideas¹⁸ and customs.

From the 1790s onward, Cuba took the place of the English and French *sugar islands*¹⁹, leading the world's sugar production. The *new economic policy* of Francisco de Arango y Parreno, a Cuban criollo, *to make of Cuba the heir of Saint Domingue, was one decisive event in its history*. For, it promoted the importation of large numbers of black slaves to develop the emergent sugar industry, transforming Cuba from a sleepy colony to a rich plantation. The ensuing changes created the economic growth that followed in the next 80 years, as well as the demographics and complex socioeconomic background for the political movements that developed throughout the XIX Century.

A *second decisive event* affecting Cuba was *the independence of the United States, and its territorial expansion*. Americans worked to enlarge their country *to its natural borders*: Pacific Ocean, British Canada, and Mexico²⁰. But Americans also had a place, in their expansion plans, for Cuba²¹, an island at the entrance of the strategic Gulf of Mexico. Coping with (1) the growth of the sugar industry and its economic and demographic consequences, and (2) the American efforts to acquire Cuba²², has driven the island's history since the start of the XIX Century to date. These events have also defined four lines of thought that, under different forms and names, prevail in Cuban politics: (1) colonialism²³; (2) annexation²⁴; (3) autonomy²⁵; and (4) independence²⁶.

¹⁴ Ricla, Bucarely, de la Torre, Navarro and finally Luis de Las Casas. See Márquez-Sterling (1975).

¹⁵ Saint Domingue, later Haiti, was the richest French colony in the XVIII Century. Evans-Smith (1985).

¹⁶ French colonists in Haiti claimed citizenship rights. But so did poor whites, free mulattos, and finally, black slaves. The revolution destroyed the Haitian economy and dispersed whites all over the Caribbean.

¹⁷ Santo Domingo, today the Dominican Republic, was possibly the most impacted. It first suffered the invasions of Toussaint L'Ouverture and later, that of Leclerc. Ensuing wars fostered mass exodus of its Spanish population. In 1822 Haiti invaded it, and absorbed it, until 1844 that it obtained its independence from that country –and not Spain like all other Spanish colonies. After that, under constant fear of another Haitian invasion, it sought annexation to several countries until, in 1860, it became again Spanish for five years. After that, it went its own way, but always keeping in touch with its sister islands through the actions of figures as Hostos, Puertorrican educator, and Maximo Gomez, Dominican hero of Cuban independence.

¹⁸ Freemasonry was introduced in the Caribbean –and expanded in the USA- via French-Haitian émigrés.

¹⁹ Thus called, because of their extraordinary production of sugar cane, possible through the African slave labor. For detailed statistics of production and slave population in the Sugar Islands see Rogozinski (2000).

²⁰ Also known as *Manifest Destiny*. Guerra (1964); or visit <http://www.ushistory.org/us/29.asp> (XI/22/13)

²¹ Jefferson gave, in 1809, the following advice in a letter to President Madison: “we will raise a column in the southernmost part of Cuba, with an inscription: *Ne Plus Ultra*.” Foner (1962). Also see Douglas (2005).

²² Which have included proposals to Spain to buy the island, encouragement to pro-annexation groups, pursuing war with Spain to help Cuban independence, and military occupation of the island. Foner, *ibid*.

²³ Some times called *integrismo* or *reformismo*, becoming a part (i.e., province) of continental Spain.

²⁴ Incorporation of Cuba to the United States, or to other Caribbean country such as Colombia or Mexico.

Slave trade and development of the sugar industry widened the existing breach between the eastern and western parts of Cuba, replicating at smaller scale, the differences between the Spanish and French parts of Saint Domingue. Large plantations with hundreds of recently-brought African slaves and few free blacks and mulattos, prevailed in the western part of the island. Smaller plantations with fewer slaves, many if not most born in Cuba and speaking Spanish, and a large class of small and medium white, free blacks, and mulatto²⁷ farmers, merchants and artisans, existed in the eastern part. This difference in peoples and socioeconomic conditions, explains the different regional and historical developments that occurred during Cuba's two wars of independence.²⁸

A third important factor was political: Spain underwent its own *liberal revolution* only in the second half of the XIX Century²⁹, after losing its larger American colonies and becoming a second class European power. Spanish incipient liberalism hardly extended to Cuba or Puerto Rico, its two remaining American colonies³⁰, who suffered under military control³¹. Instead, they became *cash cows*, where Spain sold its expensive products and profited from Cuba's sugar production. In addition, the choicest colonial political positions were often used to reward generals and politicians, victorious in the frequent XIX Century Spanish *revolutions*, not always competent, to the detriment and chagrin of many well-qualified and willing island natives.

In spite of all above-mentioned problems, and of their strict colonial regime, Cuba and Puerto Rico grew economically, attracting many Spaniard (farmers, artisans and small merchants) immigrants, who helped create an incipient middle class, in and around, the main cities and towns. Cuba, in particular, went from the poor, semi-abandoned colony that it was up to the XVIII Century, to the *most precious jewel* of the Spanish crown³².

Ignoring these key facts will undermine any effort to understand Cuban history during the XIX and XX Century. For, the Cuban economic and demographic situation in the XIX Century was the direct result of colonial policies to convert this island into the *Sugar Bowl* of the World. And most of Cuba's XX Century problems are just an extension and a complication of the problems created before its independence.

THE BIRTH OF THE CUBAN NATION: THE XIX CENTURY

²⁵ Spanish territory, but governed by an insular parliament and special laws, such as Canada is to the UK.

²⁶ Work in progress: small Cuba has seldom been able to resist the influence of a large, close United States.

²⁷ Generals Maceo, Moncada and Banderas were darker-skinned (mulatto and free black) Cubans, born and raised in the island, who spoke Spanish. This was not always the case with recently-arrived African slaves.

²⁸ The War of 1868-78, fought only in the Eastern part of Cuba, failed. In the Western part of the island, the large number of recently-brought African slaves created a concern in many Cubans, of a repeat of the 1795 Haitian slave revolt. Such was not a big concern in Eastern Cuba. The War of 1895 succeeded only after breaching the military *Trocha de Morón*, which divided East and West, extending the war to Havana.

²⁹ England underwent its own with Cromwell, in the mid XVII Century; and the French, one century later.

³⁰ Possibly for fear of losing them, as they had already lost all their other American colonies.

³¹ Under the status of *Plaza Sitiada*, Cuba's Governor General was the all-powerful authority in the island.

³² *La más preciada joya*; Spanish saying of the XIX Century, regarding the colonial possession of Cuba.

There is a thread of ideas carrying through several generations of *criollos*, regarding Cuba's social and economic development. It starts with Francisco de Arango y Parreño, in the last decade of the XVIII Century, who fostered *accelerated development* of the *sugar industry* through massive importation of *African slaves*³³. Alejandro Ramirez then expanded Arango's economic policies.³⁴ Fr. Jose Agustin Caballero, in the first decade of the XIX Century, wrote the first proposal for *autonomy in the island*. His student Felix Varela taught philosophy in the *Seminario de San Carlos*, and represented Cuba in the Spanish *Cortes* of 1820, where he also proposed *autonomy* for the island.³⁵

Jose Antonio Saco substituted Varela in the *Seminario*, wrote papers on Cuban *economy and social development*,³⁶ represented Cuba in the Spanish *Cortes*, where he proposed the *autonomy*³⁷, and was an ardent *adversary of Cuba's annexation to the United States*, a predominant theory of the times, among *Criollos*. Another Varela student, Jose de la Luz y Caballero,³⁸ continued this work after Saco and Varela were forced into exile. Luz founded schools, chaired the *Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País*,³⁹ and died in the island in 1862, highly respected. The most prominent Cuban intellectuals of the XIX Century, including Del Monte and Menvide, and later Varona, Govin, Martí and others of the generation of 1880, were directly or indirectly, *disciples of these first great Cubans*.⁴⁰

During the period of 1835 to 1855, Cuba's landed and educated classes became interested in the annexation to the United States. They thought Cuba was too small to conduct a successful independence movement. And they were afraid of the newly arrived black slaves. Those few who, at the time, looked into severing Cuba's ties from Spain, thought this only possible by joining a larger country, where slavery were legal. They would then acquire larger freedoms (of commerce), enjoy political rights -and also their slaves.⁴¹

Mutual intolerance created a gridlock: the Spanish authorities became reluctant to grant autonomy to the island, and *criollos* decided to seek separation from Spain at any cost, including annexation. There was no desire, or either side, to find a negotiated solution. For, the extremists of both groups were in control. And those few seeking a reasonable settlement had no leverage. In addition, large sectors of artisans, merchants and small farmers, white, free blacks or mulattos, remained indifferent to these initial efforts⁴².

³³ Arango later recanted such policy of inundation of the islands with African slaves.

³⁴ See Alvarez Díaz et al (1964); Martínez-Fernández, *ibid*; Moreno Friginals (1976); Marrero (1981).

³⁵ See Shelton (1993); Remos (1958); Moreno Friginals (2002); McCadden (2001); Guerra (1925).

³⁶ *Caminos; y Causas de la Vagancia en Cuba*. Saco also edited *Revista Bimestre*. See Arroyo (1989).

³⁷ For which he was deported by Cuba's Captain General (Spanish Governor) Miguel Tacón. Maso, *Ibid*.

³⁸ Luz is the pioneer of Cuba's education in the XIX Century. See Shelton (1993); Remos (1958);

³⁹ Institutions created by King Carlos III in all Spanish domains, to foster socioeconomic development.

⁴⁰ See Remos, *Ibid*; Gjeltén (2008); Ortiz (1973); Bizcarrondo and Alorza (2001), Maso, *Ibid*.

⁴¹ Spain looked at Cuba's landed and educated classes as dangerous separatists, and used slavery to instill in them, the fear of an African revolt, as a tool to keep Cubans docile. Moreno Friginals (1976).

⁴² The expedition of Narciso López, for example, landed in Cárdenas in 1850, and in Pinar del Río in 1851, without winning support from the local population, mostly indifferent to the insurrection. Maso, *Ibid*.

Jose A. Saco⁴³ firmly opposed the annexation to the United States. He wrote a series of articles⁴⁴ opposing such approach, arguing that if Cuba were to become an American state, its culture, language, customs, and eventually all the power of its landed classes would be rapidly overrun by the better organized and soon-more-numerous American immigrants⁴⁵. Saco has been criticized for being a representative of his class and epoch. However, despite all his shortcomings, Saco remains Cuba's first genuine statesman.

Luz y Caballero, essentially an educator and moralist, is another case study of the evils of intolerance. The Spanish government considered Luz a dangerous separatist, unable to see that, as Varela and Saco before him, Luz sought a political *evolution within Spain*, in lieu of a costly and violent revolution for independence, or the annexation to another country. But colonial autonomy was still a concept way ahead of its time.

Cuban and Puertorrican hopes⁴⁶ were raised when, in 1866, Spain finally convened a *Junta de Información* to improve conditions in these islands. But only more and higher taxes resulted from this conference. And the frustration it brought about triggered Cuba's first War of Independence (1868-1878) as well as the *Grito de Lares*, in Puerto Rico.

Spain, as opposed to the British in Canada, was unable to address the plight of Cubans and Puerto Ricans⁴⁷, because of shortcomings in its own political system⁴⁸. Spanish *liberals* were unable to recognize the legitimate claims of its colonies⁴⁹. Autonomy would only be granted to Cuba and Puerto Rico, in 1898, as a result of Cuba's Independence war, the Sagasta-Muñoz Rivera pact, and the threat of an imminent US intervention!

The Cuban War of 1868-78 destroyed the Eastern landed *criollo* class⁵⁰, hurt the educated class, and the class of small and middle size farmers and artisans⁵¹, many of them free blacks and mulattos⁵². However, this terrible war was not fought in vain. It brought (1) the emancipation of slaves⁵³, (2) a limited but active two-party system⁵⁴ and (3) laws of

⁴³ His epitaph reads: "Aquí yace José Antonio Saco, que no fue anexionista, porque fue más cubano que todos los anexionistas." Alvarez Díaz et al., *ibid*; Rexach (1991); Saco (2001, see especially the preface)

⁴⁴ *Papeles Políticos sobre Cuba*, is a collection of Saco's political writings (Saco, 2001).

⁴⁵ As had occurred in Texas in 1836 and would occur in New Mexico and California (1848). Guerra (1964).

⁴⁶ Political and social development in both islands ran in parallel, during the XIX Century, with adjustments for Cuba being larger and richer than Puerto Rico. See Da. Lola Rodríguez de Tío's famous verse: A Cuba.

⁴⁷ Many Puerto Rican delegates to the Spanish *Cortes* were also *autonomistas*. For more on *autonomismo* in Cuba and Puerto Rico, see Bizcarrondo and Elorza (2001), J. A. Ayala (1991), and Soucy (2009).

⁴⁸ Timid steps toward a parliamentary monarchy were taken in Spain, after the *pronunciamientos* of 1833, 1844, 1854, 1868 and 1873. It was not until the *Restauración* of 1875 that such appeared. Comellas, *Ibid*.

⁴⁹ A Cuban saying about Spanish politicians was: *son liberales en España, pero españoles en América*.

⁵⁰ Such as Céspedes, Agramonte, Aguilera, Cisneros, and other *Criollo* large land owners and intellectuals.

⁵¹ Such as Máximo Gómez, Calixto García, Vicente García, and other white ranchers and farmers.

⁵² Such as the Maceos, Moncada, Banderas, and other free black and mulatto small farmers and artisans.

⁵³ Zanjón Treaty (1878) recognized the freedom of slaves incorporated in the rebel army. After that, it was nonsensical to maintain slavery any further. In 1880, a series of laws were passed that freed them all. By then, most slaves were already born in Cuba, as slave trade had slowly grinded to a halt after the 1844 slave *Conspiracy de La Escalera*. Chinese and Yucateco indentured servants substituted the slaves. Immigration of Gallego and Canario farmers, was also fostered to increase labor. Guerra (1925); Maso, *ibid*.

⁵⁴ *Partido Liberal Autonomista*, advocated internal self-government, and *Unión Constitucional*, advocated permanent union with Spain, and representation only as a province, in Madrid's *Cortes*. Bizcarrondo, *ibid*.

freedom of the press and of association⁵⁵. In addition, the war affirmed Cuba's incipient nationality, creating a more homogeneous society: one that autonomists⁵⁶ and separatists could address, during what José Martí called *el reposo turbulento*⁵⁷, to build the ideological framework of the War of 1895, and to develop the basic organization of the new republic that emerged, after the First American Intervention of 1898-1902.

Had Cubans and Spaniards been more *tolerant*, that is, able to (1) *intelligently discuss their differences*, and (2) *negotiate in due time* an insular parliament, Saco's keystone proposal⁵⁸, the terrible wars of 1868-78 and of 1895-98⁵⁹ could have been avoided. Spain would have not been humiliatingly defeated by the US, in what was known as *el desastre del '98*⁶⁰, losing her remaining empire, and becoming a *third class* power. But more significantly yet, Cuban and Puerto Rican history would have been very different.

Cuba and Puerto Rico could have formed an autonomous federation⁶¹ *within Spain*, a European power that could provide stability and *prevent foreign intervention*, as in the island of Jamaica⁶². *Severed from Spain*, Cuba and Puerto Rico, two small islands just a few miles off the largest economic, political and military power in the Americas, have experienced, directly or indirectly, serious economic and political pressure from the U.S.

This author finds completely incomprehensible the notorious segment of José Martí's unfinished letter to Mexican Manuel Mercado, found on Martí's desk at the time of his death at Dos Ríos⁶³. For, with the separation of Cuba and Puerto Rico from Spain, the last obstacle that prevented US interventionism in the Spanish Caribbean was removed, as can be confirmed by the many American occupations that have occurred, after 1898.

THE XX CENTURY AND THE REPUBLIC

Cuba began its life as an independent nation with a remarkable act of political maturity and savvy:⁶⁴ accepting the Platt Amendment⁶⁵ imposed by the United States as a condition to terminate its military occupation. Unfortunately since then, most Cuban

⁵⁵ Many *Autoctonomous Freemasons* in Cuba and Puerto Rico became leaders of their Liberal Parties, and founded the respective Grand Lodges. Soucy, *ibid* and Bizcarrondo and Elorza, *ibid*. Ayala, *ibid*.

⁵⁶ Similar pro-autonomy parties arose in Cuba and Puerto Rico, after 1880, but their plight was ignored.

⁵⁷ Period between the two independence wars: 1880 to 1895, with active, peaceful political engagement

⁵⁸ Saco sought for Cuba an autonomic state, with an insular parliament, such as Canada had from Britain.

Spain finally set up autonomous governments in Cuba and Puerto Rico, in January of 1898, when Cuba was destroyed by three years of war and a clash with the United States was unavoidable. See Bizcarrondo, *ibid*.

⁵⁹ Between Weiler's *Reconcentración* and Máximo Gómez' *tea incendiaria*, Cuba was largely destroyed.

⁶⁰ Some Spaniards stated that *it was honorable to lose a war to the Americans, but not to Máximo Gómez*.

Cubans would have not destroyed the Spanish fleet, or taken the Philippines; only demanded independence!

⁶¹ Martí, Betances and Hostos, among others, sought such a federation. See Romeu-Fernández (1959).

⁶² British suzerainty provided Jamaica with the political status that has protected it from enduring foreign interventions, an advantage that other *independent* Caribbean nations have not enjoyed.

⁶³ "(...) de impedir a tiempo, con la independencia de Cuba, que se extiendan por las Antillas los EEUU."

Dos Ríos, V/18/1895. <http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/marti-moncada/col-05.html> Accedida VIII/5/12.

⁶⁴ Conventional wisdom during the *Convencion Constituyente de 1901*, regarding the approval of Enmienda Platt was: *más vale una república a medias, que ninguna república*. See Portell, Ch. 2 (1986), Maso, *Ibid*.

⁶⁵ Platt Amendment gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuban politics, to safeguard American life and property, as well as the Naval Base of Guantanamo. Portell, Ch. 2, *ibid*. Encyclopedia Britannica.

politicians have demonstrated two negative traits: (1) *lack of tolerance*, refusing to negotiate with the opposition⁶⁶, and (2) actively seeking US involvement whenever things have not come out their way⁶⁷. Furthermore, (3) Cuban middle and educated classes, *as a social category*, have lacked an adequate involvement in politics⁶⁸, and (4) American governments have actively sought to influence, or intervene in, Cuban internal affairs⁶⁹.

Tomás Estrada Palma, Cuba's first President, created hundreds of schools, hired scores of teachers, and constitutes a classical example of intolerance and pro-Americanism. Don Tomás and his Moderado Party refused to accept the Liberal victory in the 1906 election. The latter instead of negotiating took to arms. Don Tomás, unable to quench the revolt, called in the Americans⁷⁰, who established the Second Intervention (1906-09).

In the 1909 elections, the Liberals again won⁷¹. Socioeconomic inequalities triggered a racial war in 1912⁷², strongly repressed,⁷³ thus avoiding another intervention. In 1913, Conservative Mario García Menocal⁷⁴ was elected. During 1917 elections, Liberals again revolted⁷⁵ claiming that, as Don Tomás, Conservatives had misused government power to rig the results. Again, U.S. Marines were ready to come ashore, and some briefly landed in Oriente province. However, Liberals and Conservatives, realizing the imminent danger, toned down their disputes thus avoiding a third American intervention⁷⁶.

In 1921 Alfredo Zayas, a scholar, was elected president. The *U.S. Special Envoy*⁷⁷ Enoch Crowder *suggested* cabinet ministers and other policies, *as condition* for avoiding another intervention. Zayas successfully maneuvered throughout this period, including peacefully settling an internal revolt⁷⁸ and passed the government on to Machado, elected in 1925.

⁶⁶ Exercise known in American politics as *horse trading*, which is the basis for parliamentary democracy

⁶⁷ Cuban politicians, unlike American ones, have never learned that *politics ends at the water's edge*.

⁶⁸ Had these always maintained the level of involvement they have kept after 1959, when their economic interests were affected by the revolution, contemporary Cuban history might have been totally different.

⁶⁹ Some times militarily, as in the Second Intervention (1906-09) or through the threat of an intervention (as in 1912, 1917, 1923). Franklin D. Roosevelt, elected, in 1933, substituted Theodore Roosevelt's policy of the *Big Stick* by the *Good Neighbor*, whereby instead of the U.S. Marines, diplomatic pressures were used, as with Crowder, in 1920, and with Summer Wells, in 1933. Guerra (1964), Portell, Ch.4, *ibid*, Maso, *Ibid*.

⁷⁰ Marines then landed and the US took again over the Cuban government. Portell, Ch. 3, *ibid*.

⁷¹ General José Miguel Gómez, Liberal caudillo of the War of 1895, was elected. Portell, Ch. 5, *ibid*.

⁷² Charles Magoon American interventionist administration encouraged black leaders Ivonet and Estenoz to organize a racially-based political party, totally forbidden by (black Senator) *Morua Law*. Insistence on this issue brought armed clashes between blacks and Gomez' government. We note, in passing, how Magoon's proposition came from a nation that tolerated *Jim Crow's laws*, and *black linchings*, in the South.

⁷³ *La Guerrita de los Negros* took place in Camagüey and Oriente provinces. U.S. Marine units were ready to land, had the Cuban government been unable to control the insurrection. Portell, Ch. 5, *ibid*.

⁷⁴ American-trained engineer and 1895 War General. He governed between 1913-21. Portell, Ch. 5, *ibid*.

⁷⁵ *La Chambelona*, the 1917 Liberal armed revolt in Camagüey and Oriente provinces. Portell, Ch. 5, *ibid*.

⁷⁶ Cubans were terrified with the possibility of a *Third Time Charm* intervention, that could become final.

⁷⁷ This situation was not unusual at the time in the Caribbean basin countries. See Vasconcelos (1998).

⁷⁸ The *Movimiento de Veteranos y Patriotas* uprising in Las Villas, in 1923. See Portell, Ch. 5, *ibid*.

General Machado⁷⁹ constitutes an interesting case study. A modernizer, he implemented a statist and nationalistic economic model similar to that which contemporaries Ibañez, in Chile, Vargas, in Brazil, Calles and Cárdenas, in Mexico, were also implementing.⁸⁰ Machado changed the constitution to re-elect himself triggering a radical revolution that triumphed in 1933⁸¹ and significantly changed Cuban future politics and politicians.

Beginning with Machado, Cuba endured several autocratic presidents⁸², whose efforts to control the country and remain in power, were supported by a nationalistic discourse, economic development and public works. In each case we can identify a similar pattern:

1. *Government controls the political machine.* Machado used *cooperativismo*, where all parties would share Congress; Batista used an *activist army*, with educational and economic functions, in addition to military. Both followed the *Caudillo* model, similar to *Italian Fascism*, characteristic of the 1920s and 1930s. Finally, Castro *abolished all political life*, and created a *one-party*, Soviet-style *socialist state*⁸³.
2. *Government then develops necessary and useful economic programs to gain public support:* Machado built *Carretera Central*, *Capitolio*, *Malecón*, *Universidad*, *Hotel Nacional*, and fostered industrialization through *aranceles proteccionistas* of 1927; Batista fostered education via *Maestros Sargentos* and *Escuelas Cívico-Militares*⁸⁴, three-year economic plans, hospitals (*Maternidad Obrera*, *Topes de Collantes*); and Castro developed an entire socialist scheme, *extending health, labor and education programs* beyond large urban centers and for all social classes, while *nationalizing private property* and *dismantling* most organizations of Cuba's *pre-1959 civil society*.
3. *Opposition, dislodged by government, instead of negotiating fights and/or seeks U.S. support.* Machado provoked the *1930-33 revolution*⁸⁵, and was initially substituted through *la mediación*⁸⁶ of U.S. *Special Envoy* Sumner Welles. Batista⁸⁷, with *military and U.S. support* controlled violent insurgencies after 1933⁸⁸. He returned to power in a 1952 coup⁸⁹. All civic efforts to find negotiated solutions⁹⁰ failed, leading to violent struggle⁹¹ and to the 1959 revolution. Castro *banned all forms of opposition*, and all

⁷⁹ Gerardo Machado, a Liberal 1895 War General from Las Villas, was the first president to create efficient policies to develop Cuban industry. For his side of the story, see Machado (1982). Also, Portell, Ch. 5, *ibid*.

⁸⁰ For a XX Century account of Latin American history, see Dabene (2000) among other authors.

⁸¹ Marking the end of Cuba's First (Aristocratic) Republic (of Generals and Doctors).

⁸² Machado (1925-33), Batista (1933-44, 1952-58), and Fidel-Raúl Castro (1959-present). See Portell, *ibid*.

⁸³ Marking the end of Cuba's Second (Bourgeois) Republic and implanting a one-party socialist state.

⁸⁴ *Military boarding schools*, such as Ceiba del Agua, provided scholarships for the education of poor and rural students. *Teacher Sargents* took public education to the remotest regions of the countryside.

⁸⁵ Armed and violent opposition groups, developed by organizations such as ABC, OCRR, DR-AIE-FEU.

⁸⁶ Welles pressured the Cuban army, and Machado resigned. A short-lived interim government was created. Non-commissioned officers and left-wing students then overthrew this government, creating *la Pentarquía* (five-member collective presidency that resigned after five days), never recognized by the US government.

⁸⁷ Governed indirectly, as Chief of the Army (1933-39), and then directly, as president (1940-44).

⁸⁸ *Grupos de acción* from the 1933 revolution include ABC (revolted at Castillo de Atares); *Jóven Cuba* (sabotages in 1934-35), and *Communists* (strike, 1935). They were all suppressed by Batista and his Army. After the 1944 election of President Grau, they reorganized, creating an atmosphere of gangsterism.

⁸⁹ Given after eight years of corrupt but democratic and liberal governments, and US government blessing.

⁹⁰ Cosme de la Torriente's civic dialogue, in 1956; Márquez-Sterling's third party, in the 1958 election.

⁹¹ Moncada, Goicuría and Palacio Presidencial attacks, Cienfuegos military revolt and finally guerrillas in the mountains, organized by M-16-7, DR/FEU, OA, 2do. Frente, and other revolutionary movements.

political parties, controlled the media and the economy, and his *rivals were jailed or went abroad*. There, activities such as the *Bay of Pigs* attack were organized.

4. *After the government falls, all programs from its administration are denounced and abandoned, administration officials (efficient or incompetent) are replaced, and the cycle repeats*. After Machado, intellectuals of the caliber of Orestes Ferrara and Ramiro Guerra; after Batista, programs like Hospital Topes de Collantes, Escuelas-Cívico Militares and Maestros-Sargentos; and under Castro things not product of his revolution, were discarded or abandoned. *Such inefficient policies can only produce waste and prevent or delay Cuba's badly-needed socioeconomic development*⁹².

Only three civilian presidents governed Cuba during 1920-1959: Zayas, Grau and Prio.⁹³ All showed serious corruption problems, but respected civil rights and negotiated with their opposition. In general, political parties had short lives and depended more on their leaders' charisma, than on specific programs⁹⁴. In addition, part of Cuba's middle classes shied away from actively participating in national politics⁹⁵, concentrating instead on more profitable activities⁹⁶, thus leaving public affairs to *professional politicians*⁹⁷.

In spite of the above problems, and by the grace of God, and the talent and hard work of many, Cuba improved, inch by inch. Every government, however corrupt, left some good.⁹⁸ *Enmienda Platt* was finally abolished; Cuba built a highly recognized *university*, whose roster of intellectuals and professionals is *too long to list*; its *artists and athletes* are *world-renowned*. The Cuba of 1958 (as well as that of 2012) is, by far, much better than that of 1902. Cubans are the proud children of *all those heroes that preceded them, and were able to achieve so much, with so little, and under more adverse conditions*⁹⁹.

DISCUSSION

We derive no pleasure in criticizing our Cuban co-nationals, from all quadrants of the current conundrum. This is not an exercise in catharsis, either. We pursue a very practical objective akin to that of AA¹⁰⁰: first recognize a problem; then, define a process to fix it.

⁹² A similar paradigm can also be identified in several other countries of the Caribbean basin.

⁹³ We do not consider *La Pentarquía* (1933), which was unacceptable to the US government, nor interim presidencies of Grau, Mendieta, Barnet, Gomez, or Laredo Bru, between 1933 and 1940. They were either short-lived, or just figureheads under the influence or control of General Batista. See Portell Ch. 6, *ibid*

⁹⁴ One exception was the well-organized PSP (socialist/communist party) who had stable leadership, local activists, and a clear (Marxist) ideology. PSP also operated a national newspaper and a radio station.

⁹⁵ A popular saying of the times was: *Las personas decentes no se meten en política*.

⁹⁶ During 1910-29, fancy upper and middle class neighborhoods were built in Havana (Vedado, Miramar, Country Club). In 1940-59, more neighborhoods were developed (Biltmore, Nuevo Vedado, Tarará, Santa María, Varadero) that illustrate the middle class new economic power. Romeu (2011). Portell, Ch. 7. *Ibid*.

⁹⁷ Two mottoes, one American and one Cuban, explain it all: *you get what you pay for*. And *aquellos polvos trajeron estos lodos*. Such lack of interest in public affairs, by many, later brought much grievance to Cuba.

⁹⁸ Including the current one, which extended employment, medical and educational services to all citizens.

⁹⁹ The other two Spanish Caribbean islands also struggled in their own ways: Dominican Republic under the Trujillo dictatorship (1930-61) and Puerto Rico, a US commonwealth, under Muñoz Marín (1944-64). The frequent movement of populations and civic leaders between, them attest to their continuous relation.

¹⁰⁰ Alcoholic Anonymous, a self-help group that rehabilitates former alcoholics, using inner-strength.

We see the Cuban problem as having three components: *government, opposition and philosophy*. The group (1) *holding the government*, wants to preserve it indefinitely, by neutralizing or disabling the opposition. Those in (2) *the opposition*, believe the way to power is to use violence to replace, and then ostracize, those in government; and when this fails, to seek external support, usually from the US. Finally, the (3) *philosophy of mutual exclusion*, used by both, government and opposition, always fails because it precludes the possibility of *negotiating*, and of *incorporating* the positive policies and the competent people, from the previous administration, once these are out of power.

There are *two main issues* that hinder or delay the solution of the Cuban problem. *First*, Cubans have been traditionally concerned with foreign (US) intervention in their internal affairs. On the other hand, and like any other world power, the US promotes what they believe to be their best national interests. Given Cuban's proximity to the US, and its strategic position in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, the US has an understandable interest in Cuba. Recognizing this fact is just common sense, and *Realpolitik*.

Therefore, it is the responsibility of the *Cuban government*, the *opposition*, and the *general population*, especially the educated classes, to *conduct a policy that avoids foreign intervention*. And it is the responsibility of the *US government to respect the Cuban sovereignty*. Many years ago, don Manuel Marquez-Sterling expressed this truth in no uncertain terms¹⁰¹.

Secondly, the Cuban government needs to open a space for the opposition, and the *opposition must use it judiciously, to negotiate with the government*. Systems that have successfully transitioned from totalitarianism to pluralism, such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Spain, have allowed a space for, and negotiated with the opposition¹⁰². And systems that have failed to do so (USSR, DDR) have imploded. It is the responsibility of the government, the strongest of the antagonists, to allow the development of such a space.

Summarizing, a *successful solution* for the current Cuban impasse requires that all parties (1) *exercise tolerance*, and (2) *negotiate their differences* (3) *in an appropriate space*. In the next section we overview three successful examples of such mutual accommodation, and of the corresponding negotiating strategies.

Several Transition Examples

In the 1960s the military in Brazil, concerned with Marxist advances in the region, and fearing that such a regime could also emerge in their country, staged a coup and installed a dictatorship under the cover of a two-party democracy¹⁰³. They dissolved old political parties and created the MDB¹⁰⁴, which included the *opposition*. In it, those outside of (or in disagreement with) the establishment could find a space and a voice, no matter how

¹⁰¹ *Contra la ingerencia extraña, la virtud domestica*. Marquez-Sterling (2005).

¹⁰² For more comparisons of Spanish, Brazilian and Chilean transitions, with Cuba, see Romeu (2009).

¹⁰³ Proyecto Geisel-Golbery. For details of this historical period, see Ferreira and Almeida (2003)

¹⁰⁴ *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*, only opposition organization allowed. It included leaders such as Neves, Guimaraes, Richa, Montoro and Henrique Cardoso, who eventually facilitated the transition.

timid or restricted. Thus, the government left some room, however constrained and controlled, for part of the opposition to congregate and grow leaders, with whom the government could conduct conversations. Such a space eventually fostered the transition.

In 1985, support for the government declined, while that for the MDB and opposition forces increased. The ensuing transition process, that took over 15 years, started with the election of a new administration¹⁰⁵. There were severe disagreements and serious issues to surmount. But there was no foreign country, which could be perceived by either side as imposing a solution or favoring a specific group, meddling in such process. Neither Portugal, the OAS, or any other nation, imposed Brazil a time-table or schedule.

Readers familiar with the Spanish transition (1970-1985) following Franco's death will recognize similar characteristics, resulting from a clear desire to negotiate a transition. The rigid group that directed Franco's government after the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 was, during the 1960s, gradually substituted by that of Laureano Lopez-Rodo and his economic team. They started a series of political, social and economic reforms¹⁰⁶ that fostered, after the death of General Franco, the transition of 1975. Again, there was no foreign country, which could be perceived by either side as imposing a solution or favoring a specific group, interfering in the process. The European Union did not impose a time-schedule, or any other pre-conditions, to the Spanish transition.

In Mexico¹⁰⁷, a similar situation resulted with the PRI¹⁰⁸, created by General Calles¹⁰⁹ in 1929¹¹⁰. PRI system developed further under President Cardenas¹¹¹ with the creation of conservative PAN¹¹², the *loyal opposition*. In the 1980s, left-wing PRD¹¹³ was formed. In these, those outside the establishment, albeit supervised and controlled and with scant possibilities of attaining real power, found a space to congregate and operate.

The Mexican political system¹¹⁴ functioned under *very singular, unwritten rules* that made it quite unique and ensured its domination (*hegemonia*) for over seventy years¹¹⁵.

¹⁰⁵ Tancredo Neves prematurely died, and was substituted by Sarney. See Ferreira and Almeida, *ibid*.

¹⁰⁶ Such as the return of many political and *Civil War exiles*, and the *Ley de Asociaciones*. As a result, *political clubs* were allowed, and future government President Felipe Gonzalez never had to go into exile.

¹⁰⁷ For a brief but accurate account of Mexican history, see Cossio-Villegas (1983), and Krause (1987).

¹⁰⁸ *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (1929) aka *Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana*. In spite of many serious problems (e.g. corruption, violence, manipulation) PRI successfully ended revolutionary violence and fostered the stability and socioeconomic growth of contemporary Mexico. See Romeu (2000, 2001).

¹⁰⁹ For more on Madero, Calles, Obregon and Cardenas, see the series *Los Caudillos*, by Krauze (1987).

¹¹⁰ PRI roots could be traced to the Calles-Obregon understanding of 1920, when these two revolutionary generals agreed to alternate in the presidency, and implement advanced socioeconomic programs such as land redistribution, expansion of public education, restriction of the Catholic Church influence, etc.

¹¹¹ Lazaro Cardenas, one of Mexico's most important political leaders, was president from 1934 to 1940.

¹¹² *Partido Accion Nacional* was founded in 1940 by Manuel Gomez Morin, a former Calles Minister. For more on Gomez Morin, and a comparison with his Cuban counterpart, Jorge Mañach, see Romeu (2003).

¹¹³ *Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana*, a splinter of the PRI founded in 1988 by Cuahutemoc Cardenas and Muñoz Ledo, two former cabinet members under PRI governments. It is currently the 3rd political force.

¹¹⁴ It brought stability to Mexico after twenty years of revolution. Its rules addressed several problems that had plagued Mexican politics: succession, nepotism and party bickering that allowed foreign intervention.

¹¹⁵ PAN had federal Senators and Congressmen since the 1960s, and governors since the 1980s. It won the Presidency in 2000, and again in 2006. The PRI party recuperated the presidency in the 2012 free elections.

PRI's presidential candidate (*El Tapado*) was selected and announced (*El Dedazo*) by the retiring president, a few months before an election that would anoint him. Such candidate (1) could not be a relative or surrogate of the departing president¹¹⁶; (2) could not lobby for the position¹¹⁷; (3) should be from the alternative wing of the PRI¹¹⁸; (4) would inherit the absolute power with full command¹¹⁹; (5) would receive total support from all PRI corporations¹²⁰, and (5) the Mexican army would support and ensure this scheme, but would not otherwise or directly partake in the political process¹²¹.

It is worth noticing how several pernicious effects, common in Latin American dictatorial or authoritarian regimes were avoided by the PRI. For example the president, who was actually all-powerful for six years, could never be re-elected. He could not leave a proxy during his *absence*, later to return to effective, *behind the throne* power¹²². For, under the PRI, departing presidents would usually leave the country for several years, so the new ones could build their own power base, to return (if at all) years later to occupy some nominal and powerless position¹²³. The army, contrary to their behavior in most of Latin America, did not impose a candidate or staged a coup. And PRI presidential successions occurred periodically and peacefully, as opposed to the bloody ones after lengthy periods of personal power, such as occurred in Russia, China¹²⁴, or Eastern Europe.

By the end of the XX Century, having fostered an urban middle class that pressured for a political and economic opening, the PRI system finally wore out. With the supervision of uncommitted, international observers from several countries¹²⁵, a really free election was finally held in 2000. The PRI lost the presidency to PAN then peacefully moved aside.

Lessons gained from the Transition Examples

There are *three common features* in these *successful transitions*. *First*, the government *does not corner the opposition: it leaves a space*, however small and controlled, *for its participation*. And it allows such space to grow, albeit reluctantly, with time. *Secondly*, both *government and opposition work inside the system*, avoiding asymmetric foreign intrusion. *Third*, a sense of *Realpolitik* prevails among all sectors involved. Neither side tries to annihilate the other, which allows *evolution and negotiation*. *In addition*, the

¹¹⁶ This precludes Nepotism, an endemic disease of Latin American politics, including Cuba. An example is the poisoning, in 1945, of General Maximino Avila Camacho, hopeful heir brother of the sitting president.

¹¹⁷ A popular Mexican saying regarding lobbying is: *El que se mueve, no sale en la foto*.

¹¹⁸ PRI is a *non-ideological* party, sort of coalition of national forces. Examples of such policy: left-leaning Cardenas was followed by conservative Avila Camacho, who was then followed by Liberal Aleman. The alternating turns ensure stability, by not moving too fast or too much in any direction, splitting the coalition.

¹¹⁹ Departing presidents would usually leave Mexico, some times for many years, not returning until they were no longer a threat to the sitting president, to occupy an honorary and non-threatening position.

¹²⁰ An exception occurred in 1988, when *LaQuina*, the head of PEMEX Union, refused to pay homage to Salinas, the new president. *LaQuina's* home was stormed by the army, and he was arrested and jailed.

¹²¹ There have been no military coups in Mexico in seventy years, since the PRI system was inaugurated.

¹²² As Trujillo did in the Dominican Republic, during the 1940s and 1950s, with his brother and several other puppets; or more recently, as Putin did in Russia, with his former Prime Minister.

¹²³ For example, Ex-President LaMadrid became the head of *Editorial Fondo de Cultura Economica*.

¹²⁴ Recall the transitions after Lenin, Stalin, Jruschov and Breshnev, in the URSS, or after Mao, in China.

¹²⁵ As opposed to the pressures from a single, interested country, pursuing an active agenda.

presence of *unbiased multinational observers*, can serve as *catalysts and guarantors* of the process. Such occurred, for example, in Central America, in the 1980s, with the *Grupo Contadora*¹²⁶, or in Mexico, in 2000, with the *international election observers*.

In all three examples provided above, the incumbent governments eventually lost popular support. Then the opposition, using the alternative space provided to them, instead of the annihilation of the government, negotiated a peaceful change, thus avoiding civil war, as occurred in Spain (1936-39), or a foreign intervention, as in Dominican Republic (1965).

Raul Castro, who is in his eighties, in 2006 substituted his ailing older brother Fidel, who governed Cuba for half a century. Raul¹²⁷ has implemented significant¹²⁸ economic and political changes¹²⁹. He knows he has little time to pass into Cuban History, either as a failed Marcelo Caetano, or a successful Arias Navarro¹³⁰. By unilaterally imposing a timetable and a schedule for change, the US government will only provide excuses to hard-liners within the Cuban regime that do not want change. This will only delay that Cuba evolves, at its own pace, into an open society, just as Brazil, Spain and Mexico did.

Conclusions

Through several examples presented and discussed in this paper, we have shown how *intolerance* induces *lack of cooperation* between government and opposition, creating unwelcome opportunities for *asymmetric participation and foreign intervention*. The combination of these ingredients, in turn, gives rise to an inefficient, recurrent political model, composed of three stages: (1) a group inappropriately attains power, then destroys or neutralizes the existing opposition; (2) the displaced opposition either turns to violence and/or seeks foreign support, to dislodge the new government; and (3) finally reaches power, either through foreign support or through violence, discontinues previously created economic programs and substitutes all officers from the previous administration. Then, the entire process repeats itself. This paradigm was followed in the Machado and Batista dictatorships, as well as in several other Spanish Caribbean ones¹³¹. And it may well be the paradigm to be followed, to terminate the Castro brothers' regime.

Our *proposed solution* consists in persuading Raul Castro to (1) *open a space* for the opposition; then, for all parties to (2) *use it as a framework to negotiate* their differences, (3) *without foreign interference*, that may create asymmetric opponents.

¹²⁶ Grupo Contadora: initiative organized by the foreign ministers of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama, to help resolve the military conflicts occurring in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, during the 1980s. <http://eleconomista.com.mx/sociedad/2013/01/09/grupo-contadora-trascendental-america>

¹²⁷ For more on Raul Castro, and his possible role in a Transition, see Romeu (2008, 2009b).

¹²⁸ For details of such changes, their problems and their consequences, see The Economist (2012),

¹²⁹ Raul has experimented, for the first time, strong (even when passive) resistance from hard line sectors of Cuba's Communist Party, opposing his proposed economic changes. See Dominguez (2012)

¹³⁰ Caetano succeeded ailing Salazar, in Portugal, in the 1960s. Unable or unwilling to make badly needed changes, he was deposed by the military during the *Revolucion de los Claveles*, in 1973. Arias presided the Spanish government in 1975, when Franco died. He allowed the start of the Transition, and transferred the power to more moderate Franco era ministers (Suarez, Fraga) who successfully completed such Transition.

¹³¹ Rojas Pinilla, in Colombia; Perez Jimenez, in Venezuela, Ubico, in Guatemala, to name just a few.

Such a solution will certainly take time, patience, good will, and possibly international support, of the type that the *Contadora Group* provided Central America, in the 1980s.

The skeptical will say that there is no way to persuade the Castro regime without external force. And thence the need for embargos, pre-conditions, etc. such as the ones currently in place by the US government. However, we do have seen the Cuban regime change, responding to economic circumstances, since the loss of the Soviet subsidies in 1990. The Cuba of 2013 resembles very little to the Cuba of the 1980s. The older generation of the Castro regime has sons and grandsons to protect from a general collapse, just as the older generation of the Franco regime did. This is the real force behind a transition in Cuba.

For, if the *Cuban government* remains *unwilling to (1) open a space and (2) negotiate with its alternative groups*, it will end up as Spain did, at the end of the XIX Century, when it refused to discuss a solution for the colonial status of Cuba and Puerto Rico.

If the *Cuban opposition*, inside and abroad, *fails to negotiate* with the government and instead *seeks foreign backing* to overthrow it, Cuba will end up as it did, after its Independence War of 1895: with a *Republic like that of 1902*.

Finally, if *the US government* unilaterally places *pre-conditions and specific demands* to the Cuban government¹³², *and supports specific opposition groups*, as occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan, *Cuba may return* to the conditions that produced its 1959 revolution, and that helped to keep such revolutionary government in power, for over fifty years.

Only the intelligence of all participants will determine the final outcome.

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¹³² The compliance with specific time-schedules for holding elections, for example.

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