Marshall’s (2002, under review) theory of sacralization is extended in a macro-historical direction. The mechanism is offered as an explanation for why collective violence is a common correlate of modernization. By this account, moralistic violence within or arising from societies undergoing modernization is a manifestation of sacralization, as members of modernizing societies are torn between the social inertia of tradition and the temptations of modernity. Individuals within such societies are faced with an ongoing need to choose between these two sets of incompatible but equally compelling behaviors and values. As per sacralization, these choices require justification and facilitation, which can be and often are accomplished via the projection of diabolical moral properties onto the ideas, artifacts, and individuals associated with the un-chosen option, setting the stage for moralistic and absolutist violence upon these others. This dynamic can arise spontaneously within a population, but is also amenable to manipulation by interested parties as a means of mobilizing populations for violence. The goal of this paper is to outline the case that a number of disparate historically significant acts of violence can be illuminated and unified via this mechanism. Examples are culled from three historical periods associated with distinctive manifestations of collective violence: Early Modern Europe and America (witchcraft accusations), 20th century Germany and Japan (The Axis Powers in WWII), and the 21st century Muslim World (Jihad).
For Durkheim ([1898] 1963; [1912] 2001) “the sacred” is the fundamental social fact, the first category, and the essence of religion. Drawing on his work, as well as that of Caillois (1959), Eliade (1957), Freud ([1913] 1950), Weber ([1922] 1993), Berger (1967), and Tetlock et al. (2000), I define ‘sacredness’ as: a moral property ascribed by some observer(s) to some object(s)\textsuperscript{1} which: (1) compels certain behavioral proscriptions and/or prescriptions (taboos and/or duties) that are unwarranted by the observable properties of the object itself; (2) are antithetical to rational calculation, absolute, and contagious; (3) are hedonically ambivalent in that they evoke both attraction and repulsion; and (4) are morally ambiguous, taking both divine and diabolical forms across time and/or perceivers.

In a model that draws on sociological antecedents in the work of Durkheim ([1898] 1963; [1912] 2001); Weber (1993); Berger (1967); and Sumner ([1906] 1979); and the mechanisms of which are empirically grounded on Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger 1957; Brehm 1956); Marshall (2002, under review) suggests that the sacred is produced when temptation and tradition collide. When objects elicit strong motivational states in the perceiver (temptation) but the conduct prompted by such states is opposed by socially mediated and largely pre-conscious forms of behavioral control acting within him or herself (tradition), the perceiver projects a moral dimension onto these objects in order to reconcile the discrepancy between the behavior he or she is tempted to engage in and their actual behavior. The object thereby becomes sacralized. This superadded moral quality justifies and legitimates the perceiver’s abstinence (or indulgence)\textsuperscript{2} makes it easier to maintain, and precipitates new behaviors toward the object and/or others believed to violate the taboos and duties associated with it.

\textsuperscript{1} “Object” is used here in the broadest possible way, so as to include material and immaterial referents, including things, places, persons, events, and ideas, as well as their corresponding symbols.

\textsuperscript{2} If the individual chooses to indulge against powerful normative opposition, they too can recruit moral justifications by switching the valence of the sacralization, making the objects of temptation divinely rather than diabolically sacred, or, more likely by making their associated behaviors prescriptive duties rather than proscriptive taboos.
This model derives from, and parallels, Brehm’s (1956) research on post-decision dissonance, in which individuals forced to choose between two formerly equally-valued gifts subsequently rationalize their decision by subjec-
tively “spreading the alternatives”, changing their cognitions about the subjective qualities of the objects in question so that they better accord with their actual behavior. That is, they ascribe new positive features to the chosen option and new negative features to the unchosen options so as to widen the gap between them. This phenomenon has since been confirmed by many and varied replications and extensions (e.g. Aronson and Carlsmith 1963; Johnson and Rusbuldt 1989) and has recently been found to obtain not only with human adults, but also with preschoolers, amnesiacs, and bonobo apes (Egan et al. 2007; Lieberman et al. 2001).

Sacralization differs from this paradigmatic example in two ways: Here, the dissonance to be reduced is generated not by a decision between mutually exclusive goods, but by that between mutually exclusive behaviors, and the altered cognitions (projected qualities) lie primarily in the moral dimension, rather than some other subjective domain. There is ample prece-

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3 In its focus on spreading alternative options, this model has obvious affinities with Zerubavel’s (1991) discussion of the ‘splitting’ processes that individuals and societies use to create and reinforce the meaning of various entities by subjectively exaggerating the mental gaps between them. Thus, one could usefully think of sacralization as one process by which such splitting is accomplished. Doing so augments Zerubavel’s model in several ways. First and foremost, it underscores the fact that splitting is an achievement. Zerubavel sometimes seems to overemphasizes the arbitrary and opportunistic nature of the lumps and gaps that individuals and groups impose on the world. Even if such gaps are socially constructed, and don’t necessarily correspond to any ‘real’ distinctions in the world, it does not mean that desired distinctions can simply be conjured at will. Such ‘fretting’ of the world requires an active search for and/or construction of a plausibly ‘legitimate’ basis for it. The projection of positive and negative moral qualities onto the chosen and unchosen objects and behaviors, respectively, represents one significant means by which such gaps are manufactured and maintained. Another potential contribution is to re-emphasize the situational and dimensional variation that Zerubavel’s inter-individual organization (i.e. ‘rigid mind’ vs. ‘fluid mind’) somewhat occludes. Even within the ‘flexible mind’ there are some things that are held selectively rigid (i.e. ‘sacred’). The present model is a step towards understanding and accounting for the variations in rigidity that occur within minds, or across multiple individual minds. That is, it can help explain why a given individual is rigid only about that distinction, or why a given society is rigidly against the consumption of this food but not that one.

4 Following Festinger’s formulation, Brehm (like most researchers since) has interpreted the effect in terms of the need to maintain cognitive consistency, which is generally considered a rather rarified motivation. This evidence is surprising and exciting in its suggestion that the mechanism is perhaps less strictly cognitive and more evolutionarily basic than previously believed.
dent for both of these extensions to the basic model. Indeed, research has demonstrated the centrality of actual or immanent behavior to the production of dissonance effects,\(^5\) while other research (e.g. Mills 1958; Lerner 1980) has demonstrated that such subjective adjustment can and does extend into the moral domain.\(^6\)

Sacralization can occur at three different levels of sociality. First, and least socially, it can occur within an individual as a product of the collision of an idiosyncratic tradition with a collective temptation, of a collective tradition with an idiosyncratic temptation, or of an idiosyncratic tradition with an idiosyncratic temptation. In such circumstances, the resulting sacralization is more or less unique to the individual and as such, relatively weak. Here, the sacred usually takes the form of the personal habit adhered to obsessively, or ‘religiously’. At the second and more social level we note that, given the shared nature of both homeostatic and culturally acquired desires, and of the social origins and collectively enforced nature of behavioral practices and normative prohibitions, it is likely that much of the time the same tensions between temptation and tradition are experienced by potentially large aggregates of individuals within a given society or culture, giving rise to unorganized but socially patterned collective behaviors. As discussed elsewhere

\(^5\) That is, the process of dissonance reduction appears to be reliably triggered only by inconsistencies among behaviors or between behaviors and belief (i.e. not by those among conflicting beliefs). Likewise, dissonance arousal seems to require a, and adhere primarily to the, behavioral manifestation of the decision at hand.

\(^6\) Of course, the projection of moral valences is not the only available means of spreading the alternatives. In fact, objective justifications (e.g. “I could contract a disease, be caught”, etc.) are typically preferable because of their more generalized acceptability (Festinger 1957). Thus, where these are available and subjectively adequate, the theory predicts little or no need for sacralization (see fig 1). However, such external justifications are not always available, and even when they are (especially with regard to strong primary motivations) they may not by themselves constitute convincing justifications. Thus, the knowledge that fried chicken livers are very high in cholesterol (an objectively valid reason for many of us to abstain) may not be sufficient to enable or justify our abstinence when actually presented with a plate of them. Likewise, the potential objective consequences of having one’s sexual indiscretions revealed may well be inadequate to the task of insuring one’s restraint in the heat of the moment, or of justifying it afterward. A behavior which is an objectively bad idea is easier to perform, and harder to justify refraining from, than one which is a bad idea and subjectively evil, thus the functionality of such moral projection (Joyce 2006).
eating disorders such as anorexia and bulimia are possible examples of this kind of socially significant sacralization. At the third and most social level, to the extent that these tensions are shared by a group rather than an aggregate – that is, a population that is interconnected and who not only share these tensions, but collectively express and address them – they can give rise to sudden, spontaneous outbursts of coordinated collective behavior.

An important variation on this last level occurs when the tensions existing in a population do not spontaneously manifest themselves in action, but are consciously or unconsciously exploited by interested parties via propaganda. As Ellul (1972) has observed, propaganda does not so much change beliefs and opinions as it builds upon existing prejudices and predispositions in the target audience to provoke them to take actions the propagandist desires. In its absolutism, compulsivity, and imperviousness to rational calculation, individuals’ capacity for sacralization is a uniquely powerful lever that the observant propagandist can do much with. As Ellul observes:

...the propagandist tries to create myths by which man will live, which respond to his sense of the sacred. By ‘myth’ we mean an all-encompassing, activating image: a sort of vision of desirable objectives that have lost their...practical character...and become overwhelming, all-encompassing, and which displace from the consciousness all that is not related to it. Such an image pushes man to action precisely because it includes all that he feels is good, just, and true (1972: 31).

An Example of Sacralization

Sacralization theory would argue that homophobia in males is a product of the homophobe’s experienced collision between his own temptation to engage in sex with other men, and internalized social norms against such behavior common to his culture. Unlike both the heterosexual majority, for whom abstinence from homosexual intercourse is a matter of biological preference, and the homosexual minority, who are likewise following the dictates of their biology, the homophobe’s moralistic attitude is determined by the discrepancy he experiences between the social conventions of heterosexuality which he (more or less) subscribes to, and his own temptations to depart from them. To justify this discrepancy and to maintain his effortful asceti-
icism, the homophobe imbues the objects of his desire, as well as other individuals who do not so abstain from them, with diabolical sacredness. In effect, this allows the homophobic individual to say to himself, “However much I want to, I did not and will not do that because it, and they, are evil.” This interpretation is consistent with the otherwise enigmatic insistence in homophobic rhetoric that homosexuality is a product of “selfish hedonism”, that it is a “choice” that threatens heterosexual relationships. The otherwise surprising finding that homophobic men are significantly more sexually responsive to gay pornography than are non-homophobic men (Adams, Wright, and Lohr 1996) is consistent with this interpretation.

This example also demonstrates the further explanatory relevance of sacralization. Once those who engage in homosexual acts or elicit homosexual desire have been branded ‘diabolical’ as a means of bolstering and legitimating one’s abstinence from them, this ascribed moral quality demands not only that they be avoided, but also that they be oppressed and persecuted. Once conjured, the moral qualities projected to justify and/or prevent one kind of behavior necessitates other forms of behavior, in this case, the often bafflingly violent harassment of admitted or suspected gay men. More generally, and more to the point of this paper, the sacred’s compulsive absolutism gives it an almost unique power to overcome strong countervailing forces by justifying or compelling the most extreme forms of human behavior, including altruistic self-sacrifice and violence. Thus, the model can potentially help account for otherwise mysterious episodes of these phenomena.

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7 Like the objects of temptation themselves, the existence of others who do indulge in prohibited actions exacerbates temptation by their example, and thereby necessitates the ascription of sacredness to them.

8 Let me remind the reader that Durkheim was insistent on the existence of two valences of the sacred: the pure and impure, the right and left, the holy and damned - or most accurately, the divine and diabolical. In English, the negative connotations of ‘profane’, when opposed to ‘sacred’ often result in its assimilation to the idea of the diabolical sacred, but for Durkheim and other observers since, the ‘profane’ is opposed to both the divine and the diabolical sacred, and is best understood to mean simply ‘ordinary’ or ‘common’.

9 Girard (1972) also notes the strong correlation between violence and the sacred.
The current paper examines the power of the process of sacralization to mobilize groups to coordinated collective violence by examining a handful of historically significant examples of such action. These examples have two things in common: the posited mechanism of sacralization and the historical context of modernization. My first task is to elucidate the relationship between these elements.

The Throes of Modernization and the Problem of Collective Violence

Sociologists generally think of modernization in terms of its macroscopic manifestations (e.g., urbanization and bureaucratization). What we are less inclined to see is that such macro-metamorphoses are composed of myriad micro-metamorphoses in the practices, beliefs, and values of the individuals within the transforming society. Throughout the transition, two distinctly different and potentially irreconcilable modes of life – the traditional and the modern – exist side by side. Despite the retrospective inevitability of modernization, these co-existent forms confront individuals as a recurrent and onerous choice between the comfort and normative power of deeply ingrained traditional practices and the temptations presented by modernity’s abundance of freedom, goods, and opportunity. While it may be eagerly awaited by some, steadfastly denied by others, and come to still others by force, for some significant segments of society - most likely those in its vanguard - modernization presents a truly agonizing dilemma.

On the one hand, this vanguard, being products of the extant system, are more or less completely socialized into the traditional practices and values of their society. As we know, such folkways assume a monolithic inertia, invisible, taken for granted, and backed by the full force of the society that constructs them (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Sumner [1906] 1979). Their behavioral prescriptions and proscriptions are not only comfortable, but appear to members of their society as unquestionably right, just, and true.

On the other hand, this vanguard, to the extent that they are exposed to modernization, are thereby exposed to new temptations to behave outside the bounds of these traditional rules of behavior. ‘Temptation’ is a joint function of desire and opportunity, in that where the unattainable provokes wanting unfettered by behavioral implications (e.g., one can want to fly like
a bird without being tempted to) an awareness of attainability creates a qualitatively distinct state of mind – temptation – which unlike desire alone, confronts the actor with the apparent\(^{10}\) obligation to decide what to do. Modernization arguably magnifies temptation by inflating both desire and opportunity.

As to the first, Durkheim notes that an abrupt increase (or decrease) in power and wealth tends to also produce an upsurge in anomic suicide. Though suicide isn’t among our present foci, the explanation he offers for this increase is of some relevance. He posits that such suicides are the result of a decrease in the external control of desire caused by the disruptions to the social order that such changes cause: “Appetites, not being controlled by a public opinion become disoriented, no longer recognize the limits proper to them...with increased prosperity, desires increase” ([1897] 1951: 253). Those in the vanguard of modernization are likely to experience its economic and social disruptions first and most acutely, and to thereby be first and most acutely subject to such accentuation of desire. For every person under such conditions thereby moved to suicide, it seems likely that many more experience this accentuation of desire.

As for opportunity, by simultaneously increasing anonymity and the availability of the social and material bases of vice, modernization reduces both the costs of indulgence and the potential for others’ detection of it, and thereby presents much greater opportunity for its expression. In sum, by both stoking desire and providing it expanding objective opportunities for its fulfillment, modernization generates ever-greater temptation.

Whatever their actual behavior in the face of this temptation, individuals’ awareness of the conflict between traditional constraint and the temptations of modernity necessitates the generation of new and convincing answers to the question “How could I have done that?”, or just as likely, “Why did I not indulge in that?”. One possible and effective set of answers involves reference to the moral valences of the objects and practices most closely as-

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\(^{10}\) I stress ‘apparent’ because I am not asserting that the behavior emitted is actually a product of free will. All that matters for present purposes is that the behavioral options be subjectively experienced as a choice and thus necessitate dissonance reduction. Indeed, the theory assumes that the individual’s actual behavior will be largely determined by social and/or biological processes beyond the individual’s conscious control.
sociated with the conflict, and by extension those who do not make the same choice. Thus, to the latter question one answers “Because it, and they, are evil.” This moral dichotomization accomplishes the spreading of alternatives necessary to justify one’s actions by creating morally legitimized and compelling reasons for one’s behavior.

Thus from one perspective, the act of sacralization can be seen as a functional response to an individual need. In this sense, it is a coping strategy, a technology of dissonance-reduction. But in any system, modifications to one element have repercussions throughout the system, mostly of the unintended and unforeseen variety. The manipulation of moral valences in mental systems is no different. The moral dimension that sacralization taps into appears to be a fundamental aspect of our mammalian natures (de Waal 2006, 1996; Hauser 2006; Joyce 2006; Haidt 2001). It is both an adaptation to social living and more generally a means of contending with paradoxical time horizons, in that both involve situations in which the pursuit of one’s short-term and local self interest (i.e. cheating or consuming all one’s rations at once) may be contrary to one’s longer-term and more global fitness (i.e. survival or reproduction). The point is that morality is, proximally, a mechanism that functions to make sure that obligations – to others or to oneself – get carried out.

But moral judgments have implications that extend beyond any such functionality. In attaching a moral tag to these objects and behaviors in order to validate and facilitate abstinence, one also incurs an obligation to discharge the full behavioral set appropriate to that tag. In the case of divine sacralization, this set includes attention, reverence, defense, and obeisance. In the case of diabolical sacralization, it includes termination, exclusion, oppression, and ultimately, elimination. In this lies sacralization’s primary macro-sociological relevance.

Violence within and between human groups is hardly uncommon. This is so because violence can, under some circumstances and in limited amounts, be adaptive. But outside those circumstances and in greater amounts, it is distinctly maladaptive (Lorenz 1967). Thus, the human capacity for violence is in practice subject to a mix of innate, acquired, and external checks and constraints. Put simply, violence between humans depends upon the presence of a releasing mechanism capable of overcoming these prohibitions. At the individual level, releasing mechanisms are plentiful and
diverse, including variations on themes of self-preservation, of the restoration of justice, or simple blind rage. In small, co-present groups, these seeds, combined with emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1994) and human proclivities to misattribute arousal (Schachter and Singer 1962) can readily lead to local and short-lived episodes of devastating collective violence. However, inducing larger and more loosely-coupled groups to sustain coordinated collective violence over longer periods and larger areas is much more difficult, and generally requires certain preconditions.

Among individuals, real or perceived attack is the most universally effective releasing mechanism for violence against the attacker. Attack reliably produces physical counter-attack (or at least the impulse towards it) and violent self-defense is almost always considered acceptable in the wake of such attack. Likewise, for groups with sufficient degrees of entiativity, a real or immanent attack upon a part or representative of the group is treated by members as an attack on the group as a whole, thus serving as the necessary releasing mechanism to make large-scale and sustained collective violence possible. In short, an attacked population has few qualms about defensive collective violence, and its willingness to go to war under these conditions requires little in the way of additional explanation (e.g. Pearl Harbor or 9/11). One testament to the importance of perceived attack as a releasing mechanism is the ubiquity of the use of the precipitated, fabricated, misattributed, exaggerated or anticipated attack on a nation’s citizens, personnel, or equipment as a means of mobilizing a population for an elective war. In the U.S. context alone, one can point to the Maine, the Lusitania, the Gulf of Tonkin, and Iraq’s phantom nuclear and biological weapons programs as examples of the efficacy of this technique.11

11 The 1994 genocide in Rwanda constitutes another example of this technique, in that Hutu propagandists first manufactured an image of Tutsis as hungry for a return to power, then framed the death of the Hutu president in a plane crash (probably an assassination from within his own administration and ethnic community) as the result of a plot to retake power (Smith 1996). Though the mechanism in this instance is primarily (though not exclusively) that of immanent attack rather than the sacralization process to be traced here, Smith nicely emphasizes the necessity of such a propaganda campaign over and above whatever structural and interest-based forces were at work to make such horrendous collective violence happen. As he observes following his survey of such structural features, “...but none of these factors... could have succeeded so well had people not been prepared to hate and fear...”
Absent the reality or plausible illusion of such an attack on the group itself, populations are difficult to mobilize for collective violence. Yet obviously groups can be induced to engage in it, otherwise occurrences of it would be few (since someone has to attack first, or be believed to, to induce the counter-attack mechanism) but they are not. Granting a role for other contributory releasing mechanisms,\textsuperscript{12} I argue that sacralization processes play a primary role as the releasing mechanism for much of the collective violence that occurs in the absence of plausible attack. Put simply, I contend that the spontaneous or manipulated collective diabolical sacralization of an opposing group as a response to shared temptation not only makes the group eligible for violent oppression, but obliges citizens to participate in or facilitate its occurrence.

The potential power of temptation as a releasing mechanism is implied by an interesting pattern: charges of acquiescence to temptation in general, and of sexual indulgence in particular, are a startlingly recurrent antecedent to acts of collective violence. The old American stereotypes of blacks as lascivious and oversexed are strikingly similar to those of Jews held by the Nazis, those of witches by their hunters, those of women held by men in strongly patriarchal societies, and those of westerners held by Islamic jihadists. In the same vein, the not-unfounded rumors of polygamy among early Mormons proved to be a particularly inflammatory antecedent to the vigilante attacks against them in Eastern and Midwestern states that eventually drove them to Utah (Fraser 2002).

To return at last to our earlier topic of modernization and micro-transformation, I submit that modernization has long been an important source and locus of the temptation that has necessitated widespread spontaneous and/or manipulated sacralization, and thereby fueled outbreaks of

\[\text{the Tutsi} \] (1998: 750). He also correctly identifies the Tutsi victims as the objects of a racist ‘diabolization’ on the part of their Hutu genocidaires.

\textsuperscript{12} To wit, just as individuals are quick to point to perceived injustices against themselves or others to justify interpersonal violence, collective third-party injustice can supplement, though rarely replace, perceived attack or diabolical sacralization as a releasing mechanism. Witness the spotty effectiveness of the atrocity story as a mobilization tactic (e.g. ‘Nurse Rebecca’ and fictions of Kuwaiti babies pulled from their incubators by Iraqi troops in 1991 versus the many credible but mostly ignored, stories of atrocity emanating from Rwanda during its all too real genocide).
collective violence. I contend that sacralization and its concomitant collective violence are a predictable and explicable corollary to modernization – its ‘throes’ if you will. The goal of this paper is to elucidate the relevance, relatedness, and roles of modernization, temptation, and sacralization in three different episodes of historically significant collective violence.

Case I: Witchcraft Accusations in Early Modern Europe and America

The explosion of witchcraft accusations, trials, and executions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe and America, constitutes a particularly salient episode in western history, and has attracted no shortage of explanatory attempts. Some scholars have focused on the material interests that various parties - including the ecclesiastical establishment, regional governments, local elites and clergy, accusers, or even the accused themselves - would have in propagating such actions and their attendant beliefs. Others have seen in these events an exercise in social control, an expression of intergenerational tensions, a tool for the consolidation of power, an extension of the religious wars ensuing from the reformation, or yet another manifestation of simple misogyny. Still others have emphasized the role of environmental influences from climactic change, to the presence of psychoactive agents in the grain supply or in unguents in use during this period.

Their advocates can make convincing cases, at least within some temporal and geographical ranges, for all of these explanations. Since any phenomenon as dramatic, complex, and extensive as the witchcraft craze is certainly due to a confluence of multiple, interacting factors, these need not necessarily be treated as exclusive rivals but rather can be seen as contributing elements in a shifting matrix of causal and moderating factors of varying degrees of necessity and sufficiency. But at the same time, the similarities among the many specific instances that compose this historical episode - those aspects that make them recognizable as parts of the same phenomenon - point to the existence of common, underlying contexts, forces, and mechanisms that can help account for the larger pattern.

I posit that one such underlying common context is the transition to modernity, one such underlying force is the tension this transition creates
between socially inculcated traditional patterns and the temptations of modernity, and one such underlying process is the recourse to sacralization to collectively justify and lubricate individuals’ adherence to one or the other behavioral modes in the face of strong compulsion or temptation to adopt its obverse. That is, diabolical sacralization, as a consequence of the choice between temptation and tradition necessitated by modernization, was a perhaps necessary but not sufficient contributing cause of the witchcraft craze as a whole.\(^{13}\) By this interpretation, those accused, tried, tortured, and executed as witches were victims of a collective diabolical sacralization by those on one side of the traditional/modern divide by on the basis of their choice of, or association with, the other side of this divide as a means of justifying and bolstering the accusers’ own choices in this dilemma. Put another way, the victims became witches when their accusers, occupying one side of the tradition/modernity divide, diabolically sacralized them on the basis of their location on the other side of this divide as a means of salving the dissonance evoked by their choice of sides. Once ascribed, such diabolically sacred status necessitated the violent oppression that these individuals suffered.

**Witchcraft and Modernity**

The most obvious reason to suspect a connection between witchcraft accusations and modernization is their temporal and spatial convergence. The titles of the literature on “witchcraft” conjoin it with “early modern Europe” with a regularity that in itself bears witness to the close relationship between the outbreak of accusations and the time and place of modernity’s emergence. It is striking that during Europe’s darkest and most backward period, witchcraft accusations were relatively rare, but became a fixture as modernization commenced, spread, and took hold. Thus is wasn’t until the changes of the 16\(^{th}\) century\(^{14}\) that interest in, and persecution of, suspected witchcraft ex-

\(^{13}\) Note that the claim is not that every instance of witchcraft accusation in this or any other period is exclusively or even primarily a product of sacralization due to modernization, only that the larger pattern of intensification of such phenomena in this historical place and period is.

\(^{14}\) As Erikson describes this period, “England was in the midst of a profound transition. The old social tapestry of the medieval world, with its tight patterns of corporate order and local
ploded throughout much of northwestern Europe, peaked in the early 17th century, and then subsided before the advent of the 18th (Demos 2006).

This correlation also obtains at higher levels of resolution. Muchembled (2002) notes that witchcraft fears and accusations throughout Europe typically occurred during periods of rapid demographic expansion, social differentiation, and economic change associated with modernization, and were concentrated in the border regions where urban (modern) and rural (traditional) practices and beliefs collided. Likewise, MacFarlane (1970) found that within Essex County, England, such episodes were temporally and geographically closely associated with the emergence and growth of regional textile industries. In the American context, it was similarly in the border region of Salem Village, sandwiched between the major commercial port of Salem Town and its rural attachments that gave rise to the most notable example of the witchcraft craze in the American context.

Thus, the idea that the outbreak of witchcraft accusations was, as Muchembled put it, a product of “the rural world, coming to terms willy-nilly with modernity” (2002: 146) has wide currency. But by the same token, this observation is by no means uniquely consistent with the mechanism proposed here. However, I would point out that few previous explanations for this correlation have provided much in the way of convincing mechanisms to link the macro-transition to modernity with the actual micro-level beliefs and behaviors that constitute a witch craze. These events are too extreme and too distinctive to merely reflect amorphous transitional tensions or stress-induced errors of judgment, or to simply be an arbitrary weapon in the hands of this or that interested party. What sacralization theory offers is means of connecting the macro and the micro so as to explain just how this particular historical context produces just these particular behaviors with a robust, empirical mechanism open to substantiation and generalization. To realize this potential, I must try to make the case that sacralization is indeed the responsible mechanism here.

authority was giving way to the broader designs of the renaissance... Men and women who had lived out their lives in deep provincial obscurity now emerged into an age of fresh possibilities...” (1966: 33-4).
The case for sacralization’s role in the witchcraft trials begins with the observation that its fuel is temptation and the need to make a difficult choice between alternative, similarly compelling, and locally exclusive actions.\textsuperscript{15} Accordingly, if sacralization is a relevant mechanism, one should expect temptation itself to be a consistent theme of both the general historical context and the accusations and trials themselves. This is what one finds in both direct and indirect ways.

Let us get to the direct by way of the indirect. Though the idea of witchcraft had been a part of European culture since antiquity, it was often tolerated, depending upon just how much material harm the accused witch was reputed to have inflicted (Oldridge 2002). However, in the early modern period, as the number and pace of allegations of witchcraft grew, the act was simultaneously transformed into a diabolical crime, newly and explicitly attributed to the devil and his evil machinations against the goodness of God (Cohn 2002; Kieckhefer 2002). Under the influence of scholarly and legal elites, gatherings of witches were assimilated to the idea of the devil’s Sabbath, and new and dangerous powers were attributed to them.

The significance of this transformation becomes clearer in light of the fact that witchcraft was not alone in undergoing this change. As Erik Midelfort argues, “One of the most pervasive processes across the sixteenth century was the growing demonization of the world” (2002: 242). His cited example, \textit{Teufelbucher} literature, hints at the origin and meaning of this transformation since in it, a host of human vices - vanity, drunkenness, gluttony, lust, gambling, and infidelity – which had heretofore been seen as the result of mere weakness, folly, or short-sighted self-indulgence, were now por-

\textsuperscript{15} Here, as is often the case, the competing options are equally persuasive, but for different reasons – the temptations of modernity are so on the basis of their hedonic appeal, while the force of tradition derives from the weight of social norms and conformity behind it.
trayed as manifestations of the devil at work in the world in his tireless efforts to corrupt and claim souls.

It is no coincidence that such a transformation should correspond with the advent of modernization, for with its greater mobility, anonymity, population density, and wealth, it makes all of them easier to indulge in. Here we see how, in the face of increased opportunity, and thus temptation, to engage in these venerable vices, diabolical sacralization provides new internal justifications to replace the dissipating external obstacles to their indulgence as justification for one’s continued abstention (which was in actuality due to the often invisible power of countervailing internalized social forces). Laqueur (2004) has documented a similar process of diabolization in attitudes towards masturbation in eighteenth-century European society as the construction of more, and more private, spaces increased individuals’ opportunity to engage in it. Similarly, one can read the Victorian diabolization of sexual infidelity as a response to the increase in opportunities to engage in it as a function of the increasing separation of work from the home environment during that period. In the same way, I argue that the diabolization of witchcraft at this time is of a piece with the larger diabolization of vice, and that both are a function of, and reveal, a contemporary increase in the potency and salience of temptation.\footnote{16}

From this perspective, it is significant that diabolization is not only a matter of imbuing formerly merely suspect behaviors with new depths of immorality, but also of associating them with, and attributing them to, the devil - arguably the ultimate incarnation, not only of evil, but of its seductiveness.\footnote{17} He appears on the stage of most religions in the role of the

\footnote{16 To be sure, one could see diabolization as a defensive move on the part of the church to expand its jurisdiction as its power waned (though \textit{Teufelbuecher} literature itself was a Lutheran project). But whatever the interests at work, the germane question is not why some interested authorities might want to achieve this transformation in the public mind, but how they were able to do so. And it is this question that sacralization addresses.}

\footnote{17 By the Victorian era, new figures had taken on some of this role, beings defined by the overwhelming and contagious natures of their desires, and by their own seductive desirability: vampires. Arguably, this transformation represents a partial secularization of the embodiment of temptation for increasingly secularized audiences. While still located within a Christian universe (witness the continued defensive utility of a crucifix), the vampire itself is extra-biblical and relatively independent of explicitly religious foundations.}
tempter. In the Christian bible, he debuts as the serpent who beguiles Eve into consuming that fateful fruit, and reappears in the new testament as the one who leads Jesus up the mountain to tempt him with all the pleasures of the material world. He plays much the same role in the careers of Buddha, Moham med and Zoroaster. As Roger Caillois has observed in elucidating the link between the sacred and temptation:

The devil...is not only one who cruelly torments the damned in the inferno, but also one whose tempting voice offers the pleasures of earthly satisfactions to the anchorite ... Romantic literature, in exalting Satan and Lucifer, in endowing both with every charm, has merely portrayed their true nature, according to the very logic of the sacred (1959: 38).

More directly, the importance of temptation to the witchcraft phenomenon is apparent in the themes of sexual indulgence and/or greed and envy that are ubiquitous throughout the trial testimony. Most suggestive in this regard are the accuser’s own reports of being subject to relentless and enticing entreaties to cast their lot with the devil (Demos 1970). But as per the discussion above, it is with the arrival of the devil on the scene that the temptation motif comes front and center. For he too is a fixture in the testimony, and true to form, appears not only as evil’s originator, but as its seductive embodiment, as a handsome and charming suitor, or as a prosperous merchant bearing promises of unbounded wealth and riches to those who would join him (Demos 2006; Boyer and Nissenbaum 1974). In this role, he elicits the mixture of terror and longing, the hedonic ambivalence, so characteristic of the sacred. As Boyer and Nissenbaum observe, the “afflicted girls ... acknowledged the persuasiveness of his blandishments by the very desperation with which they rebuffed him” (1974: 210).

Having sketched the case for the pervasiveness of the temptation theme to the era and to the trials themselves as a function of ongoing modernization, it remains to show that and how these forces resulted in the particular events they did.

18 Indeed, given the input “tempter”, my MS Word for Mac thesaurus returns but one word: “Satan”.
Sacralization

In elucidating the role of temptation, I have thus far focused on the increased opportunities for indulgence wrought by modernization, the consequent psychological dynamic of temptation versus tradition, and the demonization (diabolical sacralization) of those vices as a means of justifying ones’ continued abstention in the face of this increased temptation. But the kernel around which the actual witchcraft accusations crystallized lies elsewhere, at a place where the behavioral implications of modernization and their incompatibility with those of tradition come to a head in individual experience.

As Weber ([1905] 2001) demonstrates, modernization consists not only of material changes of the sort discussed thus far, but also of changes in the assumptions and expectations (i.e. ideologies) that people live by. More so than their material counterparts, such ideological transformations can consist of sharp, sudden alternations in which a new mode is substituted for its predecessor, at least at the level of the individual person and/or occasion. One such switch, germane for us, is the replacement of pre-modern communal behavioral norms with the individualist alternative proffered by modernization. This communal-individualist shift is commonly implicated by historians of the witchcraft period, and such accounts go a long way towards demonstrating the applicability of sacralization processes to the explanation of these events.

In the European context, it is Keith Thomas (1973) and Alan MacFarlane (1970) who most clearly trace the process by which the cultural change from communalism to individualism is manifest at the micro, individual, level where all action ultimately occurs. Ideas seldom if ever become a bone of contention in and of themselves; it is their realization as behaviors which prove irreconcilable with the behaviors implied by other ideas that turns them into the bases of conflict.

Thomas and MacFarlane noticed that accusations typically followed quarrels between neighbors over the refusal of one of them to fulfill some
heretofore normatively prescribed act of charity on behalf of the other.\textsuperscript{19} On one side of this exchange, they find that the accused typically conform to the classic ‘witch’ stereotype of older, widowed, women, the determinant aspect of which is their marginal and economically vulnerable social status. Put another way, they are those members of the community most likely to become occasionally or chronically dependent upon the charity of their neighbors and upon the traditional norms of communal welfare whereby they are entitled to it.

On the other side of the encounter, they find the neighbors upon whom such charitable obligations were traditionally incumbent, and for whom they were now contrary to the modern, ‘puritan’ obligations of personal wealth enhancement. As MacFarlane describes the situation, “People still felt enjoined to help and support each other, while also feeling the necessity to invest their capital in buying land and providing for their children” (1970: 205). When the witch-to-be appealed to her neighbors for help, they were faced with two more or less exclusive options: abide by the traditional norms and bestow the requested charity, or abide by the modern ethos and refuse to assist. Thus, when relatively prosperous townspeople were appealed to for help, as they always had been, they were newly tempted to refuse,\textsuperscript{20} and might just do so. But they could not yet do so with a clear conscience, for such refusal contradicted deeply internalized traditional norms of charity. Whether they did or not, among those for whom it was a difficult choice, the decision initiated a search for buttressing justifications for their decision.

When some random calamity befell the household of those who had refused the supplicant’s requests for assistance in the ensuing days or weeks, the amorphous anxiety and animosity that they had been feeling towards the supplicant, as well as their refusal to help, could be legitimated in terms of her own un-neighborly invocation of maleficia against them. Even

\textsuperscript{19} A pattern that is discernable in many accounts of accusation and trial.

\textsuperscript{20} Note that what is new here is the temptation to refuse. The desire to refuse, and thus retain control of one’s own resources, is likely as old as the practice of charity, but absent legitimating justifications, this was an unlikely and thus not truly tempting option. The arrival of a new ideology that could potentially legitimate such refusal made it tempting in ways it had not previously been.
from a traditionalist perspective, erstwhile benefactors-cum-accusers could feel justified in refusing to help a neighbor if they could imbue her with a diabolical moral quality that made her undeserving of their help. The occurrence of any one of the myriad tragic and as-yet uncontrollable misfortunes confronting villagers of the time (the sudden illness, injury or death of family members or livestock, crop failures, etc.) presented not only a marginal situation in need of defusing, but also evidence of malevolence on someone’s part – including perhaps that of the supplicant they had so recently turned away. The culturally provided manifestation of malevolent magic in the form of ‘witchcraft’ provided the necessary causal link between the event and the accused.

By diabolically sacralizing them as witches, accusers could not only salve their guilty conscience over past behavior but also annihilate a disturbing anomaly and assert an (illusory) efficacy over their world. The community as a whole (or at least a decisive plurality) were simultaneously experiencing the same tensions and thus primed to ascribe diabolical sacredness to these reminders of their prior obligations so as to pave the way for their own recent or anticipated breaks with traditional obligation.

Once the diabolically sacred nature of the accused was suspected, it compelled the ensuing process of accusation and trial, and if thence established, punishment. From the perspective of sacralization theory, the culture provided the vocabulary (witchcraft) and the random occurrence of a particular pattern of events (the denial of assistance followed by calamity) provided the occasion. But the crucial fuel for the ensuing events here is the community’s shared experience of the tension between temptation and trauma.

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21 The significance of this pattern to witchcraft accusations is further suggested by MacFarlane’s (1970) finding that such charges faded away soon after the individual duty to assist poor and elderly neighbors had been depersonalized via the local institutionalization of such assistance.

22 Among those who did offer help, post-hoc justification was no less necessary, and moral projection was no less likely a means to establish it. Any resulting sacralization in this direction would likely take the form of greater likelihood to assist others in dire straits, to assist this individual again later, and/or to cling to other traditional practices. Since such interactions and behaviors did not lead to trials or other official action, they are less likely than the obverse case to have left detectable traces in the historical record, but this doesn’t mean they didn’t occur.
dition as a result of modernization, as manifest in the norms of charity versus those of wealth maximization. Likewise, the engine that turned this fuel into collective violence on this occasion is the projection of the diabolical sacred onto the person of the accused as a means of justifying their own choice of the temptations of modernity over tradition.

We see this pattern echoed, in greater relief, in the American context. Salem Massachusetts was probably destined to be the site of a collision between modern and traditional ideas. On the one hand, it was founded by people who defined themselves in terms of their rejection of the original sin of ‘old Adam’ (the indulgence of private will) and of their collective commitment to the good of the community organism, for which all were responsible. Their ideals were those of traditional agrarian asceticism, to which they had self-consciously pledged their allegiance during their journey to the new world.

On the other hand, these very same individuals were simultaneously drawn from a somewhat radical fringe of that juggernaut of the modernizing impulse, the protestant reformation. The ‘true church’ they longed to ‘return to’, with its individual, intimate, and unmediated relationship between believer and God did not in fact lie in the past, at least not in their own, historical, past. Instead, it lay firmly in an future imaginable only by those already infected with a recognizably modern religious sentiment – as evidenced in their sect’s recruiting strength among the new commercial classes of England and the clearly commercial foundation and charter of their project (Erikson 1966). When this future (or at least the individualist part of it) arrived, it did so as a product of the same modernizing forces that had led the colonists to Puritanism, in turn led them to the new world, and whose carriers they were.

In this sense, the colonists of Salem were not only inhabiting an intermediate stage of modernization, but were in and of themselves an amalgamation and manifestation of both the modern and the traditional forces of their world. They were actively attempting to marry decidedly modern religious doctrine and institutions with decidedly traditional ideals and social forms. Constituted by, and embodiments of, the cross-cutting currents of modernization and tradition, one might well expect their experience of the conflicting pulls of temptation and tradition to be particularly acute.
Once the modernizing forces had begun to manifest themselves in economic life, it was only a matter of time until the underlying value incompatibilities to begin to express themselves: “In Salem, no less than in Boston, the rise of an internationally oriented merchant class... spawned a style of life and a sensibility decidedly alien to the pre-capitalist patterns of village existence” (Boyer and Nissenbaum 1974: 88). One or two generations after the colony’s founding, most colonists seem to have felt that the New World offered them a singular opportunity to increase their wealth and standing such that “the spirit of brotherhood which the original settlers had counted on so heavily had lately diffused into an atmosphere of commercial competition, political contention and personal bad feeling” (Erikson 1966: 139). The citizens of New England were on their way to leaving behind the stereotype of the Puritan and on their way to creating that of the shrewd (and modern) Yankee.

But for now, they were caught in the transition from the one to the other, a location which translated into an ongoing series of large and small decisions between one and the other mode, and a consequent recurrent need to justify and bolster one’s actual choices in those decisions for each of those individuals inhabiting it. One early expression of this tension was the Puritan’s oft-noted legalistic and persnickety attitude towards the finer (some would say trivial) points of their faith and practice. As Erikson describes it, the Puritan ethos could be described as “an annoying exaggeration of traditional values...” (1966: 45). From our perspective, these are all of a piece, and just what one would expect of people who are struggling to ensure and legitimate their adherence to such beliefs and practices against their own impulses to violate them.

Two concrete crises growing out of this tension between the nascent modern ideology of their doctrine and the traditional structures of their ideals preceded the witchcraft trials at the center of the present inquiry. The

23 As my discussion of these preliminary crises is based on Erikson’s classic account, I must acknowledge my debt to his argument, as well as highlight the divergence between our perspectives. For Erikson, what these episodes (like the witchcraft trials) represent is a crisis of identity, which as per the Durkheim of *The Rules of Sociological Method*, is addressed via a redefinition of deviance so as to underscore the behavioral lines demarcating what it means to be Puritan. In this view, the ensuing ostracisms, trials and executions are an integral and public part of this self-definition. By contrast, in the present account, the issue is less a
first of these, the antinomian controversy of 1636, occurred during a period of rapid growth and immigration for the colony. These new colonists brought with them some of the newer, more modern and relatively tolerant (and arguably more doctrinally consistent ways) with them from England (Erikson 1966). From the present perspective, their presence constituted a new kernel of temptation among the colonists to embrace the modernizing, individualistic strains of their doctrine at the expense of their traditional, collectivist habits. That the origins of this conflict lie in the working out of an internal tension between doctrine and practice is suggested by Anne Hutchinson’s (the leader of the antinomian dissenters) reliance upon founder John Cotton’s own sermons in her defense (Erikson 1966). In this instance, the forces of tradition (aligned as they were with the ecclesiastical power structure) triumphed with the banishment of Hutchinson and her followers from the colony.

Two decades later, much the same tensions led to a more extended crisis with the arrival of Quakers in the colony and their subsequent success at converting its citizens to their creed (again one more consistent with the animating spirit of Puritan doctrine, and more modern in the central role it accorded individual relationships with God). Though my treatment of it here is cursory, and the case still speculative, I would argue that in this episode one can make out the same dynamic of sacralization at work as will become instrumental in the witch trials to follow.

First, sacralization is especially likely here, given the fact that the Puritans of New England and their Quaker adversaries represent only slightly dif-

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24 Admittedly, the “temptation” aspect of these examples isn’t obvious or overwhelming. One can certainly speak of the inclination to reject the ecclesiastical authorities’ qualifications to identify the elect or to convert to Quakerism as a temptation to do so, but it is probably more accurate to think of the compelling force of these examples as fueled less by temptation than by the logic of the Puritan doctrine coming to fruition. In any event, these still represent difficult decisions between exclusive options, and thus remain firmly within the decision-dissonance framework and subject to dissonance reduction techniques including sacralization.
different twigs on the same branch of Protestantism. The theory implies that sacralization is likely to take place when the different options confronting the individuals in question are otherwise most similar, since it is then that subjective projection is most needed to spread the otherwise similar options apart (Marshall 2002, in review) and, as Charles Park observes, “Puritans and Quakers were so much alike that we think at once of the old saying: there are no enemies so bitter as variants of the same species” (cited in Erikson 1966: 126).

Furthermore, the Quakers’ success at recruiting converts within the colony tells us something of the ‘tempting’ or at least compelling quality of their ideas, while the internal struggles it must have instigated are alluded to in Erikson’s observation that “only too late did [the Puritan colonists] recognize that the invasion came from within, that the Quakers represented a stream of thought which was as much a part of the New England experience as [was] the tired orthodoxy they were trying to defend” (1966: 134).

More telling though, is the presence of several of the hallmarks of sacralization. For their part, the Puritans treated the Quakers and their ideas as contagious, actually boarding up windows of the jail in which they were held and taking other steps to separate them from the as-yet ‘healthy’ population so as to ward off further infection. The extremity and absolutism of their response (including confiscations, mutilations, and executions) to objectively trivial, victimless, and (at least initially) completely legal transgressions, further points to a process of diabolical sacralization.

For their part, the Quakers (especially new converts) were no less prone to sacralization. Though they had made a different choice, they too had faced the same trying dilemma and also needed to widen the gap between chosen and unchosen options. For them, this involved not a diabolical sacralization of the unchosen Puritan alternative, but a divine sacralization of their own cause. Such exalted status typically induces an attitude of absolutist self-abnegation among those who perceive it, making a positive virtue of

25 Epitomized by Rev. John Wilson’s pledge to take up “fire in one hand and faggot in the other to burn all the Quakers in the world” (in Erikson 1966: 120).
sacrifice and martyrdom. The Quaker activists exhibited this attitude in their willingness, even eagerness, to continually return to the colony to proselytize despite the rapid escalation of, and their own suffering under, the punishments doled out for doing so. This phenomenon was so pronounced that contemporary observers noted the inefficacy of the harsh deterrence strategy, pointing out that “Quakers only enjoy stirring up trouble when they stand a good chance of getting hurt in process” and when they did get hurt, they were prone to “suffer patiently and seem to take a kind of pleasure in it” (in Erikson 1966: 125).

Another two decades after the resolution of this episode in the Quaker’s favor (only through the intervention of English authorities) these same forces of modernization and the temptations attending it manifest themselves in the most infamous episode in the colony’s history – the witch trials themselves. Here, the role of modernization and its attendant temptations are front and center.

The role of temptation in prompting the New England witch craze is most clearly embodied in the person of Rev. Samuel Parris, minister of the Salem Village Church (and in whose home the whole episode originated). Having pursued a career in business before turning to the ministry, he never completely freed himself of the simultaneous loathing and allure it held for him. Despite his fascination with the power and wealth promised by the commercial worldview, he sought refuge from it in the traditional life of a village minister (although his celebrations of the traditionalists emphasis on honor, deference, and stability always retained a note of contempt for it). As Boyer and Nissenbaum observe, “the very stridency with which he denounced the worldly life attests to the allure it still held for him” (1974: 172).

His importance lies in the fact that however singularly illustrative his biography, his traditionalist message, as expressed in his sermons and actions, found traction among a substantial subset of his parishioners, “For they too, out of their own experience, felt deep uncertainty and ambivalence toward the economic and social changes which were sweeping the Anglo-

\[26\] It thereby has obvious close affinities with Durkheim’s (1951) theory of altruistic suicide which will, for now, remain unexplored.
American world” (Boyer and Nissenbaum 1974: 167), and ran afoul of another. But for neither side was the choice particularly easy:

The witchcraft testimony itself makes plain that even those who felt most uneasy about those developments were also deeply attracted by them ... at a time when one worldview was imperceptibly yielding to another, each faction must have shared enough of the other’s outlook to feel its power and be drawn to it. The [modernizing] men must at time have sensed with a pang what they were giving up in turning toward the burgeoning town and away from the village. And the [traditional] villagers for their part, must have felt deeply the lure of the forces that were transforming the town, the very forces they feared and despised (Boyer and Nissenbaum 1974: 210, 107).

Thus, though he may be commenting on a different episode, it is hard not to see Cotton Mather’s reference to the “seducing spirits” who “came to root in this vineyard” (in Erikson 1966: 158) high among his list of travails visited upon the colony as inspired in part by the witchcraft accusations and trials that had transpired less than a year before he wrote of them.

Despite strong resemblances between these events and those in the old countries, the alert reader will have noticed an important difference between them. In the European context it was mostly the partisans of modernization who projected diabolical sacredness upon the redoubts and reminders of traditional obligation in order to justify their adoption of modern, individualist modes. As Muchembled argues in his more overtly interest-driven account, it was those “attracted by the ‘modern’ forces in operation in towns and at the center of the realm” who were most prone to enlist charges of witchcraft as a means of “casting off the restrictions that were still upon them” (2002: 147). By contrast, by the time of the American experience, and in a place where modernity was ascendant, it is the partisans of tradition who recruit the sacred in the guise of witchcraft “to expunge the lure of a new order from their own souls by doing battle with it in the real world” (Boyer and Nissenbaum 1974: 180).

However Monter (2002) notes that, at least in the Jura, it occasionally was the spurned beggar, rather than the delinquent benefactor who was the source of an accusation. Apparently, even in some European cases, it was the traditional rather than modernist partisans who made recourse to witchcraft accusations.
Here, the victims were more likely to be people associated with modernity, and one’s probability of being accused was highly correlated with geographical and functional proximity to commercial centers, and engagement therewith. Thus, the pattern in the American context includes some familiar characters, e.g., aggressive beggars such as Sarah Good but featured a new category of suspects, those who engaged in practices at odds with traditional norms to their own benefit, such as tavern owners like Bridget Bishop and John Proctor, and others, such as Phillip English, the wealthiest ship-owner in Salem, who by their swift economic rise expressed discontent with their given station within the organism which was the community.

This inversion is significant because sacralization theory posits that any difficult decision can occasion moral projection – and that it can be called upon by those on either side of the decision for much the same purpose. An agonizing rejection of modernity stands every bit as in need of justification via moral projection as does an agonizing adoption of it. And in a given place and time, the same labels and stereotypes are culturally available for all to use in this process of justification. Thus, it is entirely consistent with, and suggestive of, the present model to find the same kind of witchcraft accusations being recruited by groups on both sides of the tradition/temptation dilemma in the same period.29

As in all cases, once sacralization has taken place, the compulsive absolutism of sacred status justifies, necessitates, and instigates further behavior, and these behavioral by-products (trial, torture, execution) are the reason this episode is of such interest. At the very least, the ascription of ‘witch’ status provides the releasing mechanism that makes the violence possible. As Mary Douglas observes regarding witches among the Mandari, 28

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28 Whose histories, in this context, gave witness to the economic, social, and cultural changes then underway, and reminded their accusers of their own transgressions against the old norms of mutual responsibility.

29 As noted above, it is likely that individuals on both sides of the dilemma on both continents made some use of moral projection but denied the vocabulary of ‘witchcraft’ by its prior enlistment by those on the other side, they probably manifest it in other, less noticeable, ways. Here, it is the partisans of modernity whose sacralization, realized as an active disregard of tradition, and a sanctification and eager adoption of the modern, would be unlikely to leave enduring traces in historical record.
“since they are credited with dangerous, uncontrollable powers, an excuse is given for suppressing them. They can be charged with witchcraft and violently dispatched without formality or delay” (1966: 104). But characteristically, we see that here, what was at heart simply a matter of differing perspectives vis-à-vis modernization became a morally charged struggle such that partisans on one side “treated those who threatened them not as political opposition, but as an aggregate of morally defective individuals” (Boyer and Nissenbaum 1974: 109). Once assigned, their diabolical status necessitates their cleansing (Tetlock et al. 2000).

Sacralization in The Larger Causal Matrix

I began this account with the caveat that the mechanism was only a part, albeit a crucial one, of the matrix of causes behind the witchcraft craze. It thus seems appropriate to further elucidate just how the mechanism interacts with other causal factors, and channels them into such a distinct form. By doing so, I also hope to further illustrate the potential scope and power of the model as an explanatory tool.

First and foremost, as per Norman Cohn (2002; 1975) there is no denying the importance of various parties’ many and diverse interests to these events. The point for our purposes is that these interests, however disparate, found common traction in the form of witchcraft accusations. That it provided an effective, reliable lever with which the interested propagandist could move the masses to act on behalf of those interests. The sacralization model helps make sense of why interest driven propaganda that took this particular form was so successful at this time.

We have seen that the ascription of indulgence is a well-established releasing mechanism: perhaps more so than the objects of temptation themselves, the existence of others who indulge in prohibited actions exacerbates temptation by their example, and further necessitates the ascription of sacredness as a means of justifying and maintaining abstinence against the contagion of their transgressions. As Freud notes, “Anyone who has violated a taboo becomes taboo himself because he possesses the dangerous
quality of tempting others to follow his example...every example encourages imitation, and for that reason he himself must be shunned” (1950: 32). Thus, accusations of pliancy to desire possess impressive potential to stoke popular unrest and instigate collective violence against those so accused.

The church pioneered its use of such propaganda in its campaign against the heretical Waldensian sect long before applying it to witches. In his Directorium Inquisitorium of 1368 Nicholas Emeric falsely cited a proclamation that “It is better to satisfy one’s lust by any kind of evil act than to be harassed by the goadings of the flesh. In the dark it is lawful for any man to make with any woman without distinction, whenever and as often as they are moved by carnal desire”, as an article of Waldensian faith (in Cohn 2002: 42). The gambit worked, bringing the sect into widespread ill repute, establishing them as public enemies in the public mind, and legitimizing and facilitating their subsequent brutal repression. Based on this success, absurd accusations of prolific, indiscriminant, and incestuous sexual practices became a staple of anti-heretical rhetoric for centuries.

We should thus not be surprised to find that the same charges would become integral to the official witchcraft mythology. One of the most common and effective charges leveled against witches, by their hunters was that they possessed “unspeakable appetites for copulation” (Kramer and Sprenger [1486] 1971), which was the standard explanation for their association with the devil in the first place (Gentilcore 2002; Hester 2002; Middelfort 2002; MacFarlane 1970). These appetites, and their demonic satiation are themes impossible to ignore in their ubiquity and detail in trial testimony and confessions.

Thus, even apart from the larger context of modernization, the mechanism of sacralization as a response to temptation can and does serve as a singularly effective tool for inciting collective violence. That is, the mechanism is separable from the dynamic of social change and equally compatible with interest-based explanations. Furthermore, whether such ascriptions were spontaneously projected onto witches by their fellow citizens, or consciously deployed by authorities as a propaganda tool, the relevance of the pattern for the present model is the same. The fact that the attribution of acquiescence to temptation in general, and of sexual indulgence in particular, is so demonstrably effective as a releasing and/or instigating mechanism for acts of violent oppression in this context suggests that the mecha-
nism of sacralization, or something closely akin to it as a response to temptation, was integral to the explanation of the witchcraft phenomenon as a whole.

Gender is another, related, piece of the causal matrix. To be sure, both men and women were accused, tried, and executed, but as per the prevailing stereotype, women made up the clear majority of victims, and when men were included, it was typically on the basis of their association with an accused woman (Oldridge 2002). This profound gender bias has led some observers to argue that what occurred was as much a woman-hunt as a witch-hunt (Larner 2002), and led others to cast it as but the nadir of a longer tradition of chronic misogyny in the west (Levack 2002; Midelfort 2002).

Our account, too, sees gender as an important contributing cause, in that while it was the temptations occasioned by modernization that produced the outbreak at this time, it was more chronic temptations and sacralizations that shaped the identity of those accused, and the form of those accusations.

The ascription of pliancy to temptation as a releasing mechanism against witches discussed above was more quantitatively than qualitatively distinct. For similar charges had been a staple of misogynist rhetoric at least since Juvenal despaired of the dangers of women, “high born or not, who would do anything to satisfy their hot wet groins” (in Buruma and Margalit 2004: 18). As Hester points out, such sexualization and eroticization of women is a regular feature of paternalistic societies (2002: 279) which raises the possibility that in these societies such ascriptions play a similar role in the legitimation of women’s oppression, and that their diabolicization as witches is continuous with, though an exaggeration of, extant justifications for the oppression of women in general.

But more important than their roles as the pliant subjects of temptation is women’s role as its objects. For here, too, one can discern a long-standing pattern of diabolical sacralization as a response to the temptation afforded by their proximity in the face of the ubiquitous social regulation of sexual behavior. Just as Satan is the embodiment of temptation, the seven deadly sins (a roster of the primary expressions of human temptation) are themselves historically personified in art as desirable women (Levack 2002: 236).
In the same vein, Tertullian calls women a “temple built over a sewer” and charges them with being “the devil’s doorway...lead[ing] astray one whom the devil would not attack directly.” Likewise, St. Paul, who from his prior life as Saul of Tarsus, knew a thing or two about temptation, claims that “Woman is the origin of all sin, and it is through her that we all die” (Panati 1996: 187). Such diabolicization of the object of temptation comes to a crescendo in the era of witch trials. In his ad extirpanda Pope Innocent IV makes a point of targeting, among others, beautiful women for execution because witches work their evil by “inclining the minds of men to inordinate passion” (Panati 1996: 187). Most revealingly, in the Malleus Maleficarum, Kramer and Sprenger ask “...what else is a woman but...a necessary evil, a natural temptation, a desirable calamity and domestic danger, a delectable detriment, an evil of nature, painted with fair colors!”, and charge that “A woman is beautiful to look upon, contaminating to the touch, and deadly to keep”([1486] 1971: 43, 46). In such passages the frustration of mortal men pledged to abstinence becomes palpable in the vigor of their projection of the diabolical sacred.

We see here hints of a supplemental story in which women, as objects of desire, are chronically prone to diabolical sacralization, which facilitates their abuse and oppression. This oppression is in turn further legitimated and maintained via the ascription of unseemly sexuality, thereby creating the conditions for even greater oppression. In hand with the new dynamics of sexual and other temptation ushered in by modernization in the witchcraft era, this pattern culminates in demonization.

30 The pattern of Paul’s biography: youthful indulgence followed by a vehement counter-reaction of prudery and vehement derogation of the objects of desire, is echoed in that of Boccaccio. In the Decameron he declared that his “soul has been pledged to women since childhood”, a claim validated by his five illegitimate children. But by the time of the Corbasso, he was writing instead of the ’pigsty of Venus’ and asking “Why waste time on women? No other creature is less clean than woman, even the pig wallowing isn’t as foul as they”. Apropos of our argument here, Parks notes of him that “...whatever position he seems to endorse, the tension of attraction to its opposite is always present” (2002: 52).

31 Of course, it is fair to point out that those typically tried and executed for witchcraft were not usually among the most desirable women in the community. Arguably though, to the extent that desirable women were diabolicized as women, this category bore the brunt of the diabolicization as a category. From this category, it was then its most vulnerable members, those lacking the kinds of protection that youth and beauty can secure, were the most likely to bear the wrath attached to their gender as a whole.
A final piece of the causal matrix, again integral to many accounts, is the reformation. As Erikson observes, “witchcraft was brought in on same current as the Protestant reformation” (1966: 153). The reformation is itself a major manifestation of modernization, with Protestantism the carrier of modernist values and Catholicism the organizational defender of tradition. In other ways, the reformation and counter-reformation represent a clear clash over the vested material and political interests of states and ecclesiastical organizations. Both of these interpretations are fully compatible with, and augmented by, sacralization theory, but the reformation also provides us with yet another contemporary example of sacralization.

As in the case of modernization as a whole, the extent to which the reformation presented itself to individuals as a distressing decision point is commonly overlooked. Even where central governments managed to construct confessional states (e.g. Protestant Scotland, Catholic Italy), the imposition of such homogeneity was a difficult and imperfectly realized struggle. The advent of a continent-wide challenge to the authority of the Roman church that directly addressed the spectrum of long-festering complaints and resentments against it would surely have created decision dissonance for innumerable individuals throughout its empire. Regardless of their eventual choice, the mere knowledge of an alternative viable and significant enough to be so actively and massively suppressed by the church would have presented a novel occasion for ‘choice’ throughout its territories.

Again, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that such macro-transformations are ultimately composed of a near infinity of micro-conversions. For some substantial subset of subjects, their pent up frustration with the status quo meant that change could not come fast enough. Thus, the movement, when it came, moved fast and ultimately succeeded in seceding. For another group, there was never any real chance of conversion. After all, the new Protestant competitor by no means supplanted the Catholic incumbent, but merely provided a parallel alternative. Another, unfortunate, group, on both sides, had little choice by virtue of living in an area where conversion or conservation was accomplished and maintained by force. But between, and within, these groups lay millions who at some point likely entertained thoughts of conversion or longed for a return to the comfort of the old rituals. Because each offered something of value (as per the old saying, “the Protestant prefers to eat well, while the Catholic prefers to
sleep well”), both professed Catholics and professed Protestants could surely feel the pull of their opposite, and needed a way to put more distance between their chosen and unchosen option.

What sacralization offered was a way to do just that, and the form of diabolical sacralization culturally available to them was witchcraft. Just as partisans on both sides of the tradition/modernization divide made use of witchcraft ascriptions to reduce their own decision dissonance, both Protestants and Catholics were quick to identify the diabolical dimension of their opposites. As Stuart Clark observes, the ascription of diabolical witchcraft to those on the other side of this spiritual divide was too ubiquitous to be mere rhetoric, and was in fact integral to how each saw the other and defined themselves. “Calling each other witches helped religious enemies just to vent their anger and hatred, but it also identified what it was that was so offensive about enemy faiths, as well as evoking a sense of unbridgeable distance between them” (Clark 2002: 169). Again, once such ascriptions were in place, they served the now-familiar role as releasing mechanisms for violence. As Levack notes, “When the wars started, ideas about the Devil contributed to their peculiar ferocity. The other side was made up not just of people with whom one disagreed about points of theology, but of conscious or unconscious agents of the enemy of all mankind...” (2002: 239).

The witchcraft craze of the early modern period is a complex phenomenon, but I hope to have demonstrated that sacralization theory provides a potentially important, even necessary, part of its explanation. At a time and place where a traditional society was being penetrated by the multiple temptations of modernity, as well as the related temptations of religious conversion and of increased sexual opportunities, the intra and interpersonal tensions created by these macro-social transitions provided the fuel for spontaneous and/or manipulated projection of persons and objects associated with their eschewed choices into the moral dimension, and thereby facilitated or even produced the collective violence that characterized the period.

32 Much the same dynamic is observable within Protestantism itself, as seen in the conflict between Puritans and Quakers in Massachusetts. Similarly, earlier in the reformation, Anabaptists viewed Protestant authorities as the antichrist, and their practice of infant baptism as “a bewitching sin”, while those authorities, including Luther himself, viewed the Anabaptists as “an evil race of men and monstrous creatures” (Waite 2002).
I hope to have demonstrated that one of the singular strengths of the sacralization model is its ability to unify disparate plausible explanatory accounts. By abstracting to the dynamic of temptation and tradition and to the mechanism of moral projection, sacralization theory is able to consolidate multiple and diverse sources of temptation, to incorporate interest-based accounts via the mechanism’s amenability to conscious propagandistic manipulation, and to even accommodate environmental factors – e.g. the onset of the “little ice age” in 16th century Germany (Behringer 2002), like the geographical constraints of 17th century Massachusetts are functionally equivalent contributing factors via the additional demand they created on the traditional norms of charity. In short, by providing a framework upon which to hang particular conditions as interchangeable contributing factors on an instance-by-instance basis, the model is compatible with, and able to unify, a panoply of models whose applicability by themselves may be limited to certain instances.

Such unificatory power within a given phenomenon is of a piece with the theory’s generalizability across historical periods, places and phenomena. Because the mechanism and action resides with individual human beings, wherever and whenever human beings encounter the antecedent conditions of sacralization – the conflicting pulls of temptation and tradition - the mechanism is potentially relevant as an explanation for the kind of micro and macro-social consequences that often ensue.

Case II – Germany and Japan in the Mid-20th Century

As with witchcraft, it would be folly to attempt to reduce the explanation of a conflagration like WWII to any primary causal factor. It is, of course, a product of innumerable factors, operating at multiple levels. But here again, I contend that among the pool of contributing factors is the dynamic of temptation and tradition due to modernization and the process of sacralization. Whereas in the case of witchcraft, the behavioral manifestations of sacralization arose more or less spontaneously in the affected populations, in the present case we can more clearly see how these tensions and processes were intentionally stoked and guided to their horrific ends by interested parties using propagandistic means.
At the extra-national level at which wars take place, releasing mechanisms are every bit as necessary to collective violence as they are at the intra-societal level. However, the challenges are different. On the one hand, the targets are likely to be outsiders, and thus less subject to socialized constraints on violence than are internal targets. But on the other hand, the releasing mechanism must be applicable to a larger population and capable of enduring over longer periods. Absent an event that could plausibly be construed as an attack by the targets-to-be, large populations are difficult to mobilize for such endeavors. This is especially true when, as in the case of Germany, they are still paying the costs of the previous war or when, as in the case of Japan, they are well aware of just how much they had benefited from avoiding involvement in it. Put bluntly, the conflict, with all its attendant risks and sacrifices, had to be ‘sold’ to members of the collective to enlist their participation and support.

Thus, the unavoidable question, and the one at hand, is that of just how the general population of these two large nation-states in the mid-twentieth century could be mobilized for war in the absence of real or imminent attack from outside. It is to this question that I propose sacralization as a necessary (but insufficient) part of the answer. Specifically, I argue that the diabolical sacralization of modern practices among transitional populations provided much of the “militant enthusiasm” (Lorenz 1967) necessary to induce the citizenry of these countries to participate in, or at least accede to, historically unprecedented levels of non-defensive collective violence.

As the argument here closely follows Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit’s seminal work on “Occidentalism” (2004; 2002), it is worth taking a moment to discuss the difference between their account and mine, and the ways in which I believe the latter augments the former. “Occidentalism” is the term they coin for the diabolicization of western ideas, practices, and individuals by denizens of regions undergoing westernization. While correctly noting and emphasizing the close relationship between westernization and modernization, they frame their argument regionally, as reflected in their preference for a term that emphasizes the anti-western aspects of the movement. By contrast, I contend that modernization is the more important piece of the equation in that one can accomplish more explanatory work by framing the issue along these lines because it is modernity that is distinct about what the west brings to the societies in question.
Note for example that the 1942 Kyoto conference which Buruma and Margalit point to as emblematic of the anti-western ideology they write about was entitled “How to Overcome the Modern”, not “How to Overcome the West” (2004: 2). Meanwhile, although Buruma and Margalit seem to recognize the relevance of temptation to the phenomena they describe, they do not assign it the pivotal role that sacralization theory does, nor do they proffer much in the way of a concrete mechanism to connect the elite ideologies at the heart of their account to the observed behavioral manifestations or to the problem of mass mobilization. It is on this point that sacralization theory can augment their account, by providing not only such a mechanism, but with it, a means to further generalize their insights and observations.

The Ongoing Transition to Modernity

Coming on the heels of a discussion linking the witchcraft trials of the 16th and 17th centuries to the emergence of modernity in Europe, it seems a stretch to now try to ascribe events occurring three centuries later (and in some of the same places) to modernization. How is it possible that the modernization dynamic could recur in 20th century Europe, a time and place that would seem to have long since passed through it? Likewise, by this time Japan had been in contact with the west for centuries, and modernization had been the order of the day for decades.

But in the 1920s and 1930’s Germany and Japan both found themselves inhabiting much the same incomplete stage of modernization, and experiencing much the same conflicts. In both, traditional and modern practices co-existed, but their incompatibilities were becoming harder to ignore. They were each far enough along the transition to be able to recognize both the promise and the problems of modernity, and for it to present a viable alternative to the mutually exclusive, but equally compelling, traditional mode. Let us consider each country more closely.

Despite the emergence of modernity on its soil three hundred years earlier, Europe in the twentieth century saw the process still underway, and found itself having some second thoughts about modernity’s increasing in-
fluence. The entire continent had been baptized into the darker manifestations of modernity by the horrors of the Great War, but in Germany this dis-enchantment was exacerbated by several factors:

First was its entrenched cultural tradition of the romantic celebration of heroic *Kultur*, in the vein of Nietzsche and Wagner, and as effectively exploited by Treitschke in the first world war. As summarized by Herf, “Germany produced a series of thinkers who celebrated nonrational values on a scale simply unmatched anywhere else in Europe” (1984: 232).

Second, alongside and despite such cultural dispositions, the country was embarked on a uniquely intense path to modernization. Germany as a unified state was created out of extant fiefdoms and principalities only in the late 19th century, and had spent the intervening years trying to catch up with the rest of Europe. Again, as Herf observes, “Compared with England and France, industrialization was late, quick, and thorough” (1984: 5), as a result, “nowhere else in Europe did rapid industrialization confront feudal structures so rapidly and harshly as in Germany” (1984: 232).

This confrontation was brought to a head in the wake of the Great War by the economic handicaps imposed by the treaty of Versailles. The resultant hunger and privation stood in stark contrast to the very public excesses of Weimar-era Berlin, perhaps history’s most vivid manifestation of modernity, as expressed in the art of Dix, Grosz, and in Fritz Lang’s dystopian *Metropolis*.

Given these factors, it is unsurprising that this period gave birth to counter-reactions across the political spectrum which, at least ideologically, repudiated the modern and embraced the traditional. It is for good reason that observers of Nazi ideology have regularly emphasized the central role of the rejection of modernity in its evolution (Herf 1984), since the National Socialist Party proved to be the ultimate beneficiary and manifestation of these tensions.

What is more interesting, and perhaps decisive to what was to follow, was that this rejection of modernity was, indeed, only ideological. The intense industrialization of German manufacturing and commerce continued as quickly as the strictures of Versailles allowed (or could be circumvented).

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33 In his pamphlet, *Germany Above All: German Mentality and War* (1915), Durkheim provides a detailed and thorough analysis of this philosophy and its role in shaping that war.
Even as they rejected the larger enlightenment project, Germany’s leaders understood that to eschew the technological prowess and power that accompanied it was to consign their country to a second-rate status at best, and likely to result in its dissolution at the hands of other less ‘noble’, but technologically stronger, states.

Thus Germany, as had the Puritans of Salem, not only inhabited an intermediate stage of modernization, but tried to forge a selective alloy of the modern and the traditional, rejecting some aspects of modernity while embracing others and grafting modern technology onto traditional values. Such an integration of both the modern and the traditional seems almost designed to produce the most acute internal conflicts of temptation and tradition. A total ban on the modern is easier to enforce and maintain than is a partial one, for to accept some part of it gives it a foothold in one’s consciousness and grants it a legitimacy that’s hard to contain.

Herf has aptly termed the result of this paradoxical fusion “reactionary modernism” (1984). He sees it as a specifically German phenomenon, and to be sure, Germany represents a particularly pointed instance. But as he also notes, the basic dilemma is universal to “societies facing the consequences of the industrial and French revolutions: how can national traditions be reconciled with modern culture, modern technology, and modern political and economic institutions?” (1984: 217). I would argue that the ‘solution’ of selective borrowing as attempted here is, while hardly universal, not unique to Germany. Where it does occur, sacralization and its attendant violence are a common concomitant – as we’ve seen in the case of the witch trials, and will see again in our remaining cases – the first of which is Japan.

In the mid-20th century, Japan, like Germany, had only recently been consolidated as a state. Unlike Germany, it had to contend with the facts that it was geographically and culturally distant from the modernizing centers of Europe and America, and in possession of strong indigenous traditions that were perhaps more alien to modernity than were the European traditions that it had emerged from. Nevertheless, its consolidation under the Meiji restoration in 1868 began a period of headlong modernization in an attempt to be taken seriously on the international stage. “Never had a great nation embarked on such a radical transformation as Japan between the 1850s and 1910” (Buruma and Margalit 2004: 3). This transformation in-
cluded the rise of ideals, institutions, and movements in the best tradition of liberal democracy, but it also included modernity’s pointed predilection for unseemly individualism. It remade Tokyo as an Asian counterpart of Weimar-era Berlin, with an ethos pithily expressed as “ero guro nansensu”, or “erotic, grotesque, nonsense.”

Also like their German counterparts, its leaders recognized that a complete rejection of modernity was tantamount to electing oneself to second-class status among the nations. So like Germany, and in keeping with a pattern going back to its first encounters with the west, Japan attempted to graft the technological and organizational advantages of modernity onto a rootstock of avowedly traditionalist values and social mores (Buruma and Margalit 2004). And again, this attempted consolidation produced an acute experience of decision dissonance at the individual level. As such visions of modernity increasingly penetrated Japanese lifestyles and disrupted traditional relations and practices, they elicited increasing resistance across the political spectrum, awakened latent notions of honor and racial superiority, and glazed them with imported western notions of nationalism and the theocratic state.

_Temptation and Response_

Their shared intermediate stage of modernization and similar attempts at a selective adoption of it led Germany and Japan to produce convergent ideologies. The complaints leveled against their enemies, and the contrasting virtues ascribed to their own traditions, speak volumes about the significance of modernization to these ideologies and the effectiveness of their propaganda.

In both, strands of German high romanticism were dusted off and invidious comparisons between “mechanical” and “organic” society, as in Sombart’s “Merchants and Heroes” essay or Jung’s contrast of “soul” and “intellect”, are the raw materials with which contemporary philosophers and propagandists constructed a compelling message. Within their own myths, Germany and Japan each played the role of the organic, heroic, and soulful protagonist at war with the mechanical, mercantile, and soul-less Americans, British, and (among Germans) Jews. These messages appealed to citizens
for help in overcoming the full spectrum of modern “-isms” as itemized in Spengler’s *Decline of the West*: materialism, liberalism, capitalism, individualism, humanism, and rationalism. In both countries, what the modern ostensibly threatened to displace was a mythical romantic tradition of heroic sacrifice, discipline, austerity, obedience, the primacy of heart and will over intellect, the inherent wisdom of *der Volk,* and, in a clear echo of the witchcraft era, collective obligations.

The importance of modernization to the emergence and efficacy of this ideology is further underscored by the pivotal role that that most tangible manifestation of modernity, the city, plays in it. As we’ve already seen, these movements were in part a reaction to Weimar Berlin and Taisho Tokyo, but the city, any city, in its focus on trade and consumption, in its sheer size, and consequent anonymity, in its diverse and fluid populations, in its concentration of secular power, in the specialization, formalization, and impersonality that it makes necessary, can play the part of Babylon in this tale. The city is not merely a “symbol” of modernity. As Simmel (1971[1903]) and Wirth (1938) have demonstrated, its proponents and detractors are right to see the city as *a,* perhaps *the,* engine of modernization for it not only allows, but actually cultivates, the full panoply of modernist personality traits, while its capacity to create and concentrate wealth makes possible, at least for some visible part of the population, the kind of comfort, idleness, and alienation from sacrifice that its detractors identify with modernity.

It is impossible to miss the current of temptation running through these characterizations of the modern. The putative ‘vices’ of the modernist - comfort, survival, avoidance of conflict – are hedonically appealing almost by definition. In Sombart’s analysis, the merchant is contemptible because he owes his wealth to the satisfaction of mere and individual desires. The menace of the city, like that of its emblematic prostitute, lies in its ability to seduce the young away from the traditional, heroic path. The city supplies desire with every kind of opportunity – it is the place where everything and everyone is for sale, surveillance is difficult and anonymity easy. Beyond the sloth, idleness, and softness it enables for the few, even the more modest assets it provides to many more, along with the economies of scale that high population density allows for, make vice ever more affordable and its purveyors plentiful. “Money allows people to behave in all manners they were not born to” say Buruma and Margalit (2004: 18).
Vice is but one instantiation of the larger dynamic of temptation via modernization. The bigger picture is implicit in the pattern of biographical convergences among the leaders of, and ideologists behind, the panoply of arguably traditionalist movements in the 20th century.

Buruma and Margalit note the striking fact that Hitler, Pol Pot, Ho Chi Min, Mao, and Lenin all followed the same career trajectory of formative years spent in the provinces, followed by migration to the metropolis of Vienna, Paris, Beijing, or Zurich and subsequent rejection of, and political reaction against, it and its values (2002).

From the perspective of sacralization theory, such a pattern is completely predictable, as these leaders were among that subset who were thoroughly socialized into the traditional modes of their respective societies, but who also had the inclination and opportunity to migrate to the city and partake of its freedom and prospects for vice and social or material advancement. There, these two modes – the tradition of their origin and the modernity of their location, confronted them as competing, alternative, and mutually exclusive options. One can live in either the city or the village, but not in both. Once they had made their choice in favor of tradition, the need to

34 To be sure, many of these are associated with ostensibly “revolutionary” movements, with all the modern, forward-looking implications that term. But at the level of individual motivation or acquiescence to violence, it is arguable that these movements, too, were in part fueled by the collisions of the temptations of modernity with tradition chronic to the twentieth century. The emphasis on collective sacrifice for the collective good at the expense of individual opportunity and freedom is the uncomfortable common thread linking modern reactionary and revolutionary movements. Both groups imagined a world in which the heroic defense of the common good was the order of the day, but while one imagined this state as in the past, the other saw it as in the future. Perhaps it is the proven efficacy of the temptation/tradition dynamic as a propagandistic goad to collective violence that produces this convergence.

35 Much is often made of Hitler’s failure at the art career he came to Vienna to pursue, and in keeping with this, one could argue that he didn’t choose to eschew the city, it chose to eschew him, but it would be a mistake to conflate his failure in art – a particular, and particularly rarified occupation – with a failure at being modern. Likely, his failure contributed to his distaste for and disavowal of the modern city (which in its fin de siècle exuberance was not so different from Weimar Berlin) in which it occurred, but this does not change the fact that he occupied a location in which tradition and modernity were both available as viable, appealing alternatives which necessitated a choice between them and that he, at least ostensibly, chose tradition.
justify not only their decision to reject the enticements of the modern city, but also their disavowal of their previous aspirations for it, set in motion a diabolical sacralization of the city, modernity, and their representatives, as well as the divine sacralization of the traditional and all of the political ramifications that followed.

To return to the case at hand, the same pattern is discernable in the case of mid 20th century Japan. Time after time, one finds that the pivotal leaders and ideologists of its anti-modernist movements were drawn from those most drawn to, and positioned to partake of, the temptations of modernity. Early on, it was ‘Dutch scholars’, those who had studied western (modern) life and ways via their contacts with the Dutch trading colony in Tokyo Bay, and who went on to lead the Mito school of thought, that advocated the total exclusion (and extermination where possible) of Westerners from Japanese soil. Later, the key 20th century ideologist of the Kokutai, Takamura Kotaro, had in his youth followed his love of European Art to New York, London, and Paris before turning against it in its entirety. Emperor Hirohito had himself greatly enjoyed extended visits to Europe and New York, though he eventually came to describe western thought as “poisonous”. As Buruma notes, Meiji Japan suffered a kind of ‘cultural schizophrenia’ from its simultaneous and incompatible desires to be modern and traditional. (2003: 53).

Though Buruma and Margalit see this exposure largely as a conduit for their absorption of anti-western ideas originating within the west, I argue that the primary significance lies in these individuals’ unique position between the opposing pulls of tradition and modernity. Just as the denizens of Salem Village were, by virtue of their time and place, poised between these

36 Interestingly, one can also make out the same pattern among the grassroots-level followers. Despite the endemic Nazi misogyny, women were an important element of the movement, especially in the early years. An interesting pattern among these volunteers is that though they consistently identified themselves almost exclusively with the role of housefrau at the time of their activism, most of them had previously been employed in retail, education, or similarly ‘modern’ occupations (Koonz 1987). In short, they too had once had an apparent opportunity to choose between traditional and modern roles, and, having ‘chosen’ (under the sway of their traditionalist home worlds) to return to the traditional, were in a position to need sacralization to justify this ‘choice’ by diabolicizing the eschewed modern alternative.
conflicting modes, so were these leaders and their followers. And once again, once their lot was cast on the side of tradition, the historical die was cast as well.

As in the case of the witchcraft craze, the targets of the violence, and the charges against them are as suggestive of a sacralization process as are the identities of their accusers. Whereas within a village society it is individual neighbors who pose the greatest nomic threat, and against whom witchcraft is the appropriate diabolical charge, within the larger and more differentiated societies under consideration here, the targets are collective and less personalized. They are made up of identifiable groups whose crimes mainly consist of their role in the replacement of tradition by modernity. The primary foreign targets – Britain, France, and especially America – constitute the vanguard of the enlightenment and the primary carriers of its values of individualism, materialism, rationality, and modernity. Likewise, Heidegger’s adoption of the term “Amerikanismus” to refer to the diabolical denizen of modernity, and the extent to which ideologists of the period used “western” and “modern” as completely interchangeable synonyms (Buruma and Margalit 2004: 114), says much about the basis for their enemies’ demonization. By the present interpretation, such close identification in the eyes of those propagating violence is of utmost importance, for it is their targets’ role in, and state of, modernization that makes them subject to diabolical sacralization.

37 Though not explicitly targeted in the way that some groups were, it is worth noting that, in yet another continuity with the witchcraft trials, the Third Reich was, in ideology and practice, particularly disdainful of women. Note for example Hitler’s mantra that “the Nazi revolution will be an entirely male event” (Koonz 1987: 56) as well as the party’s continual efforts to identify modernity with softness and femininity.

38 Here we can also see the moral ambiguity so characteristic of the sacred, in that the very same ideals - democracy, rationality, consumption, comfort, etc.- diabolically sacralized by the axis powers were, to a lesser extent, divinely sacred to the allies, who found in their defense a powerful instrument of mobilization.
Modernity Incarnate: Jews in Germany

Unlike their counterparts in relatively culturally and genetically homogeneous Japan, German ideologists also identified a discrete exemplar and source of modernization somewhat closer to home in their Jewish neighbors. As this piece of the phenomenon is drawn in particularly stark relief, we will consider it in greater detail.

Of course, antisemitism in Germany, or anywhere in Europe for that matter, was by no stretch a 20th century innovation. But as Smith (1996) (following Sartre and Langmuir) observes, there is a qualitative difference between the conventional, "run of the mill" stereotyping and prejudice that had been directed at them for centuries, and the Manichean identification of the out-group with ultimate evil that the Jews were subject to at this time. I would argue that the socially constructed, essentialist "chimeria" of his account corresponds well with the idea of the diabolical sacred, and is attributable to the salience of the temptation/tradition dilemma in that time and place.

In their stereotypically urban lifestyle, cosmopolitan sophistication, and immersion in trade, the Jews of Europe were a group almost custom made for the role propaganda based on the tension between tradition and modernity required of them. In this, they provided a more incendiary focus,

39 There were internal targets of the movement who were subject to assassination, but they were so on an individual basis, typically as a function of their professed dissent from the ideals of Kokutai, or of their allegiance to enlightenment principles of government and society. Otherwise, as far as I know, there was no identifiable domestic group singled out for suppression. However, as occupied Manchuria was known as something of an outpost for modernization, I would be interested to explore shifts in the domestic population's attitudes towards its residents as the war approached, since sacralization theory would predict some demonization of them.

40 Not that it had never happened before – similar diabolicization of Jews had occurred around the time of the plagues for instance. In this case, the demonization and violence they suffered was driven primarily by the mechanism of perceived attack, as widespread rumors suggested that the disease was part of a Jewish plot.
as well as more available and vulnerable targets, than did modernity’s foreign incarnations.  

Atop this conventional and not entirely baseless association with modernity, Nazi propaganda inflamed the sacralization of the Jews by rebranding everything distinctly modern as ‘Jewish’, whether or not there was anything observably Jewish about it. Thus, the disdained modern rationality became ‘Jewish science’, commercialism and consumerism were driven by ‘Jewish retailers’, department stores were expressions of ‘Jewish materialism’, women’s liberation was a ‘Jewish idea’, and artistic modernism a ‘Jewish fraud’. Propagandists followed Sombart’s lead in focusing anti-modernist sentiments onto Jews by constructing a mythical ‘Jewish spirit’, which was fully occupied in the pursuit of abstraction and unproductive circulation that characterized the sins of modernity.

For good measure, Nazi ideologists opened a second propaganda front against the Jews, one that reached beyond the abstract temptations of modernity to evoke more immediate manifestations of the temptation and acquiescence theme. Accordingly, materialism, Epicureanism, and carnal sensuality were made part and parcel of the propaganda package and stereotype. Horkheimer captures much of the associated sacralization dynamic when he writes “Behind…the rage over Jewish immorality, over Epicureanism and materialism, is hidden a deep erotic resentment which demand the death of their representatives. They must be wiped out, if possible with torments” (cited in Smith 1996: 218). Here, Horkheimer nicely captures the potential for violence that can be harnessed and directed against those believed to, in Smith’s colorful phrase, “dwell beyond the pale of self-repression”.

On both of these fronts, it is perhaps debatable whether the ‘Jewish’ brand was being used to tar the trappings of modernity, or modernity was being used to tar Jews, but it the latter seems more likely. However ideological its message, the ultimate aim of propaganda is always to affect be-

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41 It seems likely that the earlier identification of, and action against, this proximate target was an instrumental preliminary to the later mobilization of the population of Germany for global war.

42 Sartre (1948) too, notes much the same dynamic. Where I believe both of them go astray is in the unnecessarily psychoanalytic framing of their interpretations.
havior. Given that the behavioral result of this propaganda was to induce citizens to participate or acquiesce in the violent suppression of Jews, rather than of ‘modernists’ or ‘modernism’ more generally, it seems reasonable to assume that the association of ‘Jewish’ with ‘modern’ was intended to render the Jews less sympathetic and more vulnerable as a result of this association. Moreover, the inclusion of such established releasing mechanisms as sexual indulgence and insatiability alongside the modernist traits ascribed to Jewish and Allied targets further suggests that these latter traits were intended to function in much the same way.

However it came about, the relevant point for our purposes is that the identification of the ‘enemies’ of the Reich – Jews and the Allied powers – with the forces and products of modernization proved to be an effective incentive to mobilize against them. In combination with the contemporary salience of the temptation | tradition dilemma, such close identification with modernization produced the ‘chimerical’ diabolical sacralization that permitted, or necessitated, the ensuing collective violence against them.

**Sacralization**

Having established the importance of modernization to the ideologies that enabled and led to citizen’s toleration and collusion in the collective violence of the second world war, and having made a pitch for the temptation vs. tradition dynamic as a crucial part of the mechanism by which the fact of modernization produced and cultivated these ideologies and their consequences, I now consider the evidence that sacralization did in fact occur. The most direct evidence again concerns that most salient and well-studied subset of the diabolicized – Jews in Germany. Sartre gets it right when he observes that “…the Jew is also holy...like the untouchables, like savages under

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43 Though not currently subject to sacralization, this identification has proved to be surprisingly enduring and exportable. Smith (1996) notes how contemporary antisemitism continues to be a proxy for protests against modern liberal rights and democratic values – including reason, egalitarianism, capitalism, pacifism, feminism, and cosmopolitanism. He also notes the strange case of antisemitism in modern Japan, despite the near-total absence of an actual Jewish population. Here, once again, they are cast as the embodiment of modernism foils by the anti-capitalist, anti-modernist movement there.
the interdict of a taboo” (1948: 42), and Fenichel gets to the heart of the matter when he observes: “For antisemites, Jews embody evil mana and are thus ‘both holy and accursed’ ” (cited in Smith 1996: 210).

But one can also make out the characteristic symptoms of sacralization in the behaviors and beliefs of those subject to the tensions of modernization and the axis propaganda machine. Most generally, there is the matter of moral bifurcation. Recall that ultimately, the nomic need is to reduce decision dissonance by ‘spreading the alternatives’ (Brehm 1956), which can be achieved by projecting diabolical features upon the unchosen option, projecting divine features upon the chosen option or, as it happened, doing both at once.44

As to the first, the diabolicization of the representatives of modernity is detectable in the absolutism of the resulting moral projection. Jews in Germany were not just seen as unfavorable or even ‘bad’, but rather as “the very soul of evil”, as “evil personified” (Smith 1996: 207). Such racial essentialism – the idea that moral qualities can be so completely mapped onto biological substrates – is a familiar antecedent to the use of collective violence against thusly diabolicized groups.

Accordingly, this absolutism extended to the behavioral manifestations of such projection in that its targets were treated not merely as dispensable, or beyond the protections of normative constraints on violence, but as a group whose destruction is positively desirable, even obligatory. Recall Horkheimer’s paraphrase of the attitude: “They must be wiped out, if possible with torments”. Given their absolutist association with evil, there is a certain logic to this continuity, as such “destruction would eliminate the major evil or the modern world” (Herf 1984: 225), but the glaring lack of logic in the details of this diabolicization represents another indicator that this is an example of sacralization.

As noted in its definition, the sacred is self-consciously non-rational in that it is immune to, and disdainful of, calculated decision making. This is

44 This complementary divine sacralization was undoubtedly present in the witchcraft trials as well, but as discussed above, is somewhat unlikely to have left much of a discernable mark in the historical record. Its appearance in this case is even more pronounced due to real and widespread personal costs that citizens in war, unlike neighbors in the midst of witchcraft accusations, are obliged to bear. In short, these mounting costs mandated the elevation of the cause for which they were incurred, so as to justify those costs.
evident here in the thorough inconsistency of the case made against the Jews. They were variously and sometimes simultaneously charged with being reclusive and intrusive, timid and relentless, weak and powerful. As Herf notes, “antisemites attacked the Jews for being both soulless and overintellectualized, and oversexed and money hungry” (1984: 132).

This lack of logic may have been unintentional but it is perfectly consistent with the Nazi’s official line towards rationality itself. We have already seen that among the charges made against the Allies and Jews was their embrace of rationality over will, as in Sombart’s contempt towards ‘merchants’ for their incessant calculation of outcomes, in contrast to his celebration of the ‘hero’ for his willingness to act on impulse without a second thought about the consequences. It is thus for good reason that Herf, like Arent, argues that national socialism was rendered thoroughly anti-utilitarian and irrational as a result of its ideological absolutism and scorn for reason. In light of its distinctiveness and ubiquity in Nazi ideology, Smith argues that such “illogic is symptomatic” of chimerical prejudice (1996: 216). I have argued that the disregard for reason is symptomatic (indeed, definitional) of the sacred. Thus, I raise again the possibility that ‘chimerical prejudice’ is but an alternative term for the sacred, and that such prejudice is a product of, and evidence for, the role of sacralization in these events.

Meanwhile, such diabolical sacralization of the rejected option (modernity) and its representatives is theorized to have a complementary parallel in the divine sacralization of the chosen, traditionalist, option. In the present case, just as Jews and other presumed agents of modernization were diabolized so as to allow their extermination, the representatives or embodiments of the chosen tradition are elevated to unprecedented status, and invested with impossibly exaggerated endowments of traditional virtues and moral propriety.

In Germany, the ultimate expression of this ennoblement was the triad of Fuhrer, fatherland, and Volk, all of which were elevated to a sacred status in which they not only were good, but the repository of all that was good. In Japan, the counterparts of this triad were consolidated under the umbrella term “Kokutai” (‘Japanese national essence’), which had originated with the Meiji restoration as a tool of national unification, but now underwent a profound transformation. In its new form, it affirmed the singular and inherent
superiority of Japan and its people over all others, a supremacy ultimately embodied in the person of the emperor, newly promoted to the status of a living God at the center of a new state religion, and with whom all real Japanese were expected to identify completely. The idea of Kokutai ultimately became an object of veneration in and of itself, as formalized in the *Kokutai no Hongi*, and subject to legal protections enforced by the Tokko thought police (Brownlee 2006: 13).

Here again, the sacred’s tell-tale disdain for reason and logic is on display, for the *Kokutai no Hongi* explicitly emphasized adherence to its principles on faith alone, and the disregard of logic and reason (Brownlee 2000). This reached its nadir late in the war when most of the country’s leaders realized that defeat was inevitable, but a decisive plurality of them maintained that to be swayed by such considerations was anathema to principles of Kokutai. From this perspective, extermination of the entire population of Japan was preferable to the abdication of their duty to Kokutai.45

This brings us to the most dramatic manifestation of the absolutism of sacralization: the emphasis on self-sacrifice. Peter Berger has written eloquently about the central place of masochism and self-abasement to religious experience (1969), and Caillois considered one’s willingness to sacrifice one’s life for an object as the primary indicator of its sacredness (1959).46

We previously encountered the veneration of self-abnegation as a symptom of sacralization in the case of the Quakers who divinely sacralized their cause to the point that they struck contemporary observers as disturb-

Note that this suggests that the ideologies were not merely propaganda, even to those at top, for they at some level found the message compelling.

I must admit that there is something of a confound here that may be relevant. I have written of non-rationality as characteristic of the sacred, and rationality as characteristic of modernity. Likewise, I have written of sacrifice as a traditional value, and as a characteristic of the sacred. I am not yet sure how to best disentangle these concepts. One possible interpretation would have it that these confounds reflect a natural affinity between tradition and sacralization - that sacralization itself is a more traditional than modern phenomenon. Another interpretation would hold that this confluence is coincidental, that the diabolical sacralization of tradition by modernists would also elicit self-sacrificial behaviors and prove to be non-rational in practice, even while voicing a rationalist ideal. This is of course an empirical question, one which an examination of a larger pool of cases should in time help answer.
ingly eager to suffer and die for it. In WWII Germany and Japan we once again find not only a willingness to make such sacrifice, but a positive incitement to do so. In both countries, the hero is heroic to the extent that he is amenable, or better yet, hungry for, his own extermination. As Durkheim says of altruistic suicide – which has clear parallels and relevance to sacralization – under these conditions, a kind of social prestige is attached to self-sacrifice, such that it becomes “praiseworthy to renounce life on the slightest pretext” (1951: 225). In Japan, soldiers and citizens were expected to dissolve their individual ‘small egos’ in the larger ego of the Kokutai, as embodied in the Emperor, as a means of self-liberation. Accordingly, self-sacrifice became the obligatory alternative to surrender, even as the empire collapsed, turning defeat into national catastrophe. The most famous and dramatic manifestation of this policy is the Kamikaze, but, in a dramatic break with Japanese martial tradition in which suicide was a privilege reserved for a professional elite, the ideal was now expanded to include all soldiers as well as civilians (Buruma and Margalit 2004).

I began the discussion of this case by framing it in terms of the problem of large-scale collective mobilization for violence in the absence of a precipitating attack. The fact that in the mid-20th century, both Japan and Germany, absent of such attack, did enthusiastically mobilize for war raises real questions about just how and why they did so. Specifically, what was the releasing mechanism that made this almost unprecedented level of collective violence possible? I argue that the evidence presented in this discussion provides a preliminary basis for believing that sacralization, as a re-

\[47\] Note the contrast with the U.S., which, as an attacked party, had much less need for such sacralization. Though attitudes towards the enemy were coarsened, demonization occurred, and the sacrifice of heroes was honored, the telltale celebration of, and eagerness to make, the ultimate sacrifice for the cause never became official policy or widespread practice.

\[48\] The primary ‘liberation’ offered by such identification is, I would argue, that from the need to further choose between the competing attractions of tradition and modernity.

\[49\] Those who have seen Clint Eastwood’s *Sands of Iwo Jima* have experienced the disorientation prompted by the irrationality of this doctrine, as the Japanese soldiers defending the island pursue their (or their officer’s) monomaniacal determination, not to survive, nor to triumph, nor to mount the best defense, nor to inflict the greatest costs on the enemy, but simply to die in the effort.
response to the temptation presented by modernization, is a strong candidate for this mechanism.

Briefly, we have shown that in accordance with the present model, both societies inhabited an intermediate stage of modernization and that both attempted to negotiate this stage via a strategy of selective adoption and rejection of the modern. We’ve shown that their ideologies and propaganda explicitly evoked themes of modernity and tradition, as well as of the temptation postulated to arise from this dilemma, that those leading this movement were typically individuals within each society who were first or most acutely in a position of having to make a difficult choice between these two modes, and that those who were the targets of this violence had been explicitly linked to modernization and its proxies as part of the propaganda campaign of agitation against them. Finally, we have shown that the behavioral manifestations of these ideologies exhibit several characteristic symptoms of sacralization as we have conceptualized it.

Case III - Jihad

The by-now-familiar litany of charges against the west in its role as a proxy for modernity are today again emanating from, and finding traction within, those regions of the world still undergoing the transition to modernity, where they are still producing collective violence. The Middle East is the most obvious locale for this phenomenon, but it is truly global, encompassing parts of Indonesia and Africa as well as, most interestingly, first and second-generation emigrants living within the west itself. The ‘modernists’ against which the ‘traditionalists’ choices must be justified, and whose own choices are the basis of their condemnation, are again ‘westerners’. The present conflict differs from the last in the much greater asymmetry of material power between the west and its opponents. This difference in context has transformed the expression of collective violence into that classic form of asymmetric warfare: terrorism.

This jihadist movement is sometimes framed in terms of supposed long-standing inherent animosities between Muslim and Christian religious and cultural systems. More perceptive observers have understood it as part of a more general fundamentalist reaction to modernization (e.g. Armstrong
2000), an interpretation supported by the jihadists’ own claims about their motivation and goals (Friedman 2002).

Sacralization theory again intends to supplement and extend such observations through its emphasis on the dynamic of tradition and temptation in the affected societies and its provision of a mechanism by which modernization and its attendant temptations become translated into collective violence. In making this case, we will encounter much the same kinds of evidence adduced in the previous two cases. Indeed, the remarkable parallels between all three cases are what first drew me to consider them together in this paper. 50

But in this last case, such admittedly somewhat circumstantial evidence is augmented by an important new evidentiary dimension. Since the theory in question posits certain subjective states behind its mechanism, its substantiation would ideally include evidence of the existence of those posited states. Here, some such evidence is provided by the work of Daryush Shyegan, an Iranian academic who has written eloquently on the situation of the modern denizen of the Middle East (1992). Though his is but one voice, and not that of an actual terrorist, his descriptions are notable for their affinity with sacralization theory.

From our perspective, Islam is the focus of jihad, not because of any inherent hostility toward the west, or some unique incompatibility with Christianity, or a particular proclivity to violence, but because it 1) has not yet been fully assimilated to modernity, and 2) happens to be the predominant faith in those regions of the world where modernization is currently afoot. As are most religions, Islam is the repository and legitimator of the traditional practices and belief of the societies who practice it (Berger 1969). As such, it incorporates and affirms communal standards of behavior (i.e. the five pillars) that are rather directly at odds with vital aspects of modernity such as individualism and secularism (Armstrong 2000). But unlike Christianity, it has not yet been accommodated to the ideological requirements of modernity. Though this realignment has begun, as witnessed by

50 In this vein, I’d like to note that Norman Cohn, among the most influential historians of both the early modern witchcraft trials and the modern holocaust, also saw at least these two cases as possessing and expressing common forces and mechanisms, though admittedly, he did frame those commonalities somewhat differently than I have (1981).
the emergence of a popular ‘prosperity gospel’ within the Muslim world, advanced by televangelists like Amr Khaled and Abdullah Gymnastiar, as well as the introduction of new models of lending aimed at making it profitable for banks without directly violating Koranic injunctions against usury.\(^{51}\) In short, it has yet to undergo its own modernist reformation.

The Islamic world has had a long, if often contentious, exposure to western culture (and has in fact made significant contributions to its development). But as Shyegan explains, Islam’s early cultural and technological advantages over the west fed an isolationist hubris that led its intellectuals to rest contentedly in stasis while the West underwent its transformation to modernity. In time, the modern world’s growing thirst for oil, and the discovery thereof under the Islamic world’s sands, put the two firmly back in touch. Only now it was the modernized west that held a clear technological advantage.

As with the Puritans, and Germany and Japan in the early 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century, Middle Eastern intellectuals, leaders, and affluent citizens have not only found themselves in a partially modernized world where the modern and traditional vie for loyalty side-by-side, but have also attempted to finesse this stage via strategic, selective adoption of the modern. Here, too they tried (and sometimes still do) to avail themselves of modern technological infrastructure (without which autonomous statehood is impossible), without ingesting the modern values and practices and norms that are largely integral to it (Shyegan 1992).

The result is the now familiar condition of acute approach and avoidance motivations towards modernity existing side-by-side and competing for individuals’ allegiance. As often as not, both motivations coexist and compete within, as well as between, individuals: Freidman recounts the story of a dinner at which the same Saudi woman who during one course was berating America for not doing more to press reform on the Saudi government, was over the next course defending the right of the religious police to confiscate Valentine’s day roses. He observes that “the more time I spent [in Saudi Arabia], the more I realized it was totally normal to find both views being held by the same person” (2002: 360).

\(^{51}\) I am indebted to Vicki Valosik El Zarrad for insight and information on this development.
Interestingly, the term Shyegan coins to describe this condition (and the title of his account), *Cultural Schizophrenia*, is the same one Buruma hit on to describe the situation in Meiji Japan (2003: 35), the convergent results of which we have already encountered. Shyegan sees this condition as the defining reality of the region, integral to, and largely responsible for, its distinctive problems and history. As he puts it, “We who were born on the periphery are...trapped in a fault-line between incompatible worlds...we want to be both modern and archaic, democratic and authoritarian, profane and religious, ahead of time and behind it” (1992: vii, 22). He describes the archetypical individual in the modernizing Middle East as someone “...wrestling with a contradictory double fascination: the enchanted vision of a world still infused with the aura of collective memory, and the equally compelling allure of the new and unknown...”, and goes on to admit of Western ideas and goods that “...there is something in them which I find seductive, which attracts me, something whose support I can hardly do without, even by making every effort” (1992: 5). As result of this duality, he argues that the Islamic world’s intellectuals are “creatures pulled in opposite directions by their political conviction and psychological behavior” (Shyegan 1992: 55).

Note here the familiar expression of the dilemma of modernization in the language of temptation. As Berger (2001) has observed, the temptations of the west are by no means alien or unappealing to the jihadist. In the Middle East, as everywhere else, the onset of modernization confronts those undergoing its transition with the hedonic ambivalence, the “simultaneous repulsion and fascination” (Shyegan 1992: 18) characteristic of the sacred.

The role of temptation is underscored by Sayyid Qutb’s adoption of the term “jihaliyya” to describe the pathology of the west, in that it refers to a state in which human life has been reduced to the selfish pursuit of bodily needs, the same food, drink, sex, and comfort that animals seek, and from which spiritual and aesthetic contemplation are impossible. From the perspective of sacralization theory, it is unsurprising that this attitude and ideology seems to have crystallized around the kernel of sexual desire. To wit,

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52 Shyegan would be among the first to argue for such generalizability. As he writes of cultural schizophrenia: “I believe that its scope extends beyond [Iran] and applies (to some extent at least) to most of the civilizations whose mental structures are still rooted in tradition and have difficulty in adapting to modernity” (1992: vii).
after he had followed his fascination with English literature from Egypt to the US in 1948, Qutb found himself especially distressed by what he described as America’s “seductive atmosphere” and the “immodesty” of American women (Buruma and Margalit 2004: 32). The importance of these impressions to his subsequent founding of the radical Muslim Brotherhood is reflected in his stock characterization of the modern west as a gigantic brothel where lust and greed were the order of the day.

The assimilation of the temptations of modernity to sex has remained a staple of radical Muslim ideology. As Shyegan observes, for the Islamic revolutionary, “Any enthusiasm connected with aesthetic taste oozes with sexually suspect implications. Music, elegance, beauty, anything along those lines, is assumed to mask impropriety, indecency, to represent the seductive face of hidden perversion” (Shyegan 1992: 91). Likewise, the Taliban in Afghanistan made a point of cursing women who dared to leave their home “with fashionable, ornamental, tight, and charming clothes to show themselves”, and then go on to forbid an assortment of other modern enticements, from adultery and alcohol to TV, chess, and soccer (Buruma and Margalit 2004: 45).

The hedonic ambivalence of jihadists towards the west and its vices is dramatically apparent in the 9/11 attacks. While inside America awaiting their mission, Mohammed Atta and the other 9/11 hijackers indulged in the full panoply of western vice, including alcohol, gambling, and stripclubs to a degree that far exceeds any tactical need to blend in, even as they decried western carnality, indecency, and explicitly forbade women to touch their bodies after death. Meanwhile, their target, the twin towers, symbolized “everything American that people both hate and long for” (Buruma and Margalit 2004: 14).

The fact that Qutb’s views on the decadence of the west took hold during a visit to the US alerts us to the presence of another now-familiar pattern: that it is those individuals on the vanguard of modernization, those

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53 In this vein, note as well the common thread of misogyny that runs from witchcraft trials to axis ideology and connects both to jihadism. From the perspective of the present model, the implication is not primarily that such misogyny is itself traditional, but that all of these cases partake of much the same dynamic of temptation, for which the sexual temptation afforded by women is a component and model.
who are genuinely caught between the traditional and the modern, and in a position to chose between them, that become the ‘moral entrepreneurs’ who identify, label, lead and personify such movements. One of the most striking facts to emerge right after 9/11 was that participation in the attack was not correlated with personal hardship and oppression, but was instead associated with membership in the educated, privileged, and relatively affluent classes benefiting the most from modernization. As Friedman (2002: 356) points out, the jihadists hail not from provincial and impoverished regions like Afghanistan, but from the well, but far-from-completely, modernized Saudi Arabia, particularly areas near the Yemeni border where the scenery and climate attract the most, and the most westernized, tourists. Indeed, the bulk of the Taliban government in Afghanistan itself was not indigenous, but made up of these same partially modernized elements from Saudi Arabia and other more developed countries in the region. As Buruma and Margalit observe, “The west in general and America in particular, provokes envy and resentment more among those who consume its images, and its goods, than among those who can barely imagine what the West is like” (Buruma and Margalit 2002: 15).

At the individual level, the pattern is even more striking. Osama Bin Laden is, apart from his jihadist inclinations, a well-educated, extraordinarily wealthy member of the global elite. Mohammed Atta had earned a master’s degree in urban planning in Europe, while Richard Reid, Zacharia Mousaoui, and Ahmed Omar Sheikh were all at one time or another enrolled in western business schools (Freidman 2002).

It is among immigrant Muslim youth, the first in their families to receive higher education, in cities like Cairo, Haifa, Manchester, and Hamburg that the most radical forms of Islam take hold. To quote Freidman again, “The personal encounter between these young men and Europe is the key to the story” (2002: 163). From the perspective of sacralization theory, what this encounter produces is the necessity of choosing between two incompati-ble modes of life, the competing appeals of which produce the cultural schizophrenia that Shyegan (like Buruma) writes of. As he asks, under such conditions, “How does a person adapt to a world in which two such different models are facing each other, without running the risk of falling into absurd behavior? (1992: 50). The answer provided by sacralization theory is that they do so by projecting subjective moral qualities onto both options in order
to psychologically spread them further apart, diabolical properties in the case of the unchosen option, and divine properties in the case of the chosen.

Thus, the predictable result of this projection is the same bifurcated absolutism we saw in the case of WWII, and which is indicative of sacralization. Most obviously, the central role of suicide attacks in jihadist tactics represent a singularly vivid manifestation of absolutist self-effacement, and total identification with the cause. To be sure, these techniques can be a tactical necessity of asymmetric warfare, but functionality does not automatically bring individuals willing to use them into existence. The fact that the jihadist movement seems to have little trouble recruiting or inducing its members to engage in such attacks is a sign that sacralization is at hand.

Similarly, Shyegan expresses the absolutism cultivated by cultural schizophrenia this way: “There is black and there is white; pastel tone, the nuances of chiaroscuro, penumbral shades of grey, the subtle gradation of demi-tints, have no place here” (1992: 82). Both the ‘black’ and the ‘white’ he refers to are products of sacralization, their purity is a function of the bifurcation of alternatives, the diabolical sacralization of the modern and simultaneous divine sacralization of the traditional. As he continues with regionalist echoes of German and Japanese racial essentialism, “The good is what springs spontaneously from this soil: that is what is authentic, that is what is indigenous, and never mind how nasty it may be” (1992: 82). The simultaneous “diabolicization of the outgroup” (1992: 84) means that “The technocrat – or anyway his function- is satanized, while the ignorant person – or anyway his ignorance – is sanctified (1992: 83).”

Thus, we see that many of the same patterns that suggested the role of sacralization in the first two cases – a context of ongoing modernization associated with experience of temptation and hedonic ambivalence towards it, leaders who are among those first and most acutely in a position to have to choose between the traditional and the modern, targets who are identified with modernity and its values and indicted on that basis, collective, absolutist violence against those targets and a complementary valorization of the traditional - suggests that the structure of modernization, the forces of temptation and tradition, and the mechanism of sacralization are at work here too.
Conclusion

I hope to have at least laid out a preliminary case here for the idea that sacralization, with its concomitant propensity for collective violence is a predictable corollary of modernization, perhaps even an inevitable stage thereof. Though it may take various forms - witchcraft accusations, nationalism, jihadism, or even something else - those individuals and groups most acutely caught between traditional practices and modern temptations are prone to project moral properties of the divine and diabolical onto their chosen and unchosen course – with serious world-historical consequences.

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